by David T. Moore and William N. Reynolds
In recent years, the Intelligence Community has paid increasing attention to the role of complexity science in intelligence analysis. It is well known that intelligence problems are "complex,” insofar as they are detailed, multi-faceted, and extremely dynamic. However, this insight has remained qualitative in nature, precluding the development of methods for reducing the complexity of these problems to a level within the capabilities of human reasoning. A more realistic goal is to quantitatively measure the complexity of modern intelligence problems so that their difficulty can be assessed up front. Such measurements will help determine the cost benefits associated with a problem, the resource allocation it demands, and the most useful analytic methods to solve it.
In this paper, we present a simple quantitative metric for estimating the complexity of denial and deception problems. We show that the complexity of a problem increases as a product of the numbers of possible states (in essence, true, deceptive, etc.) for each of the possibly deceptive pieces of evidence. We enumerate the complete set of contingencies that must be considered in a denial and deception problem and provide a heuristic-based method for pruning these down to a manageable set that can reasonably be considered by analysts and decision makers.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Rita Bush, David Dixon, William Mills, George Mitroka, Amanda Redmond-Neal, William Parquette, Suzanne Sluizer, and Marta Weber in the preparation of this paper.
Machines don't fight wars. Terrain doesn't fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the mind of humans. That's where the battles are won. - COL John R. Boyd
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for Counterterrorism by Troy S. Thomas
(U) FM 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
(U) FM 2-01.301 Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis by Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army
The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities by Dr. Joe Strange, USMC War College and Colonel Richard Iron, UK Army
"To Our Great Detriment": Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad by
Major Stephen Coughlin, Military Intelligence, USAR
(U) FM 2-01.301 Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis by Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army
The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities by Dr. Joe Strange, USMC War College and Colonel Richard Iron, UK Army
"To Our Great Detriment": Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad by
Major Stephen Coughlin, Military Intelligence, USAR
Teaching Intelligence Analysts in the UK
What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies Program by Michael S. Goodman and Sir David Omand Unclassified extracts from CIA Studies in Intelligence Volume 52, Number 4
Bring Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices
Learning with Professionals: Selected Works from the Joint Military Intelligence College
A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies
Experiences to Go: Teaching with Intelligence Case Studies
Shakespeare for Analysts: Literature and Intelligence
Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas
Intelligence Essentials for Everyone by Lisa Krizan
Bring Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices
Learning with Professionals: Selected Works from the Joint Military Intelligence College
A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies
Experiences to Go: Teaching with Intelligence Case Studies
Shakespeare for Analysts: Literature and Intelligence
Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas
Intelligence Essentials for Everyone by Lisa Krizan
A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis.
CIA Publications
The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers
Volume 1:
No. 1: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning
No. 2: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process
No. 3: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities
No. 4: When everything is intelligence - nothing is intelligence
No. 5: Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis
Volume 2:
No. 1: Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?
No. 2: Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence
No. 3: Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations
Volume 3:
No. 1: Making Sense of Transnational Threats
No. 2: Rethinking “Alternative Analysis” to Address Transnational Threats
A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes by Jack Davis
Estimates and Influence by Sherman Kent
The State of Strategic Intelligence by John G. Heidenrich
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards J, Heuer, Jr.
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis by David T. Moore, DIA Occassional Paper No. 14
Anticipating Suprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning by Cynthia M. Grabo
Warning Analysis for the Information Age by John W. Bodnar
The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers
Volume 1:
No. 1: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning
No. 2: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process
No. 3: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities
No. 4: When everything is intelligence - nothing is intelligence
No. 5: Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis
Volume 2:
No. 1: Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?
No. 2: Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence
No. 3: Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations
Volume 3:
No. 1: Making Sense of Transnational Threats
No. 2: Rethinking “Alternative Analysis” to Address Transnational Threats
A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes by Jack Davis
Estimates and Influence by Sherman Kent
The State of Strategic Intelligence by John G. Heidenrich
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards J, Heuer, Jr.
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis by David T. Moore, DIA Occassional Paper No. 14
Anticipating Suprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning by Cynthia M. Grabo
Warning Analysis for the Information Age by John W. Bodnar
Cells Wars: The Changing Landscape of Communications Intelligence
Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS). Research Paper No. 131 May 2009 by Joseph Fitsanakis and Ian Allen.
The 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict featured a series of innovative approaches to communications intelligence, which included utilizing civilian telephone networks to achieve tactical and psychological objectives. The "cell war" between the IDF and Hamas is indicative of an ongoing global struggle between asymmetrical insurgents and state actors to control large-scale telecommunications structures. "Cell wars" have been taking place for quite some time in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, and several other nations, including inside the United States. Weapons in this hi-tech conflict include surveillance satellites, voice scramblers, encryption software and mobile phone cameras, among other technologies. Essentially, this war is being fought over the control over national and international telecommunications grids, and centers increasingly on telecommunications service providers —companies such as Jawwal in Palestine, Roshan in Afghanistan, or Mobilink in Pakistan. These companies are rapidly becoming combat zones in a battle to control the channels of digital communications in 21st-century asymmetrical warfare.
The 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict featured a series of innovative approaches to communications intelligence, which included utilizing civilian telephone networks to achieve tactical and psychological objectives. The "cell war" between the IDF and Hamas is indicative of an ongoing global struggle between asymmetrical insurgents and state actors to control large-scale telecommunications structures. "Cell wars" have been taking place for quite some time in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, and several other nations, including inside the United States. Weapons in this hi-tech conflict include surveillance satellites, voice scramblers, encryption software and mobile phone cameras, among other technologies. Essentially, this war is being fought over the control over national and international telecommunications grids, and centers increasingly on telecommunications service providers —companies such as Jawwal in Palestine, Roshan in Afghanistan, or Mobilink in Pakistan. These companies are rapidly becoming combat zones in a battle to control the channels of digital communications in 21st-century asymmetrical warfare.
Security Before Politics
by Porter Goss, Director of the CIA from September 2004 to May 2006 and Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from 1997 to 2004.
"Since leaving my post as CIA director almost three years ago, I have remained largely silent on the public stage. I am speaking out now because I feel our government has crossed the red line between properly protecting our national security and trying to gain partisan political advantage."
"Since leaving my post as CIA director almost three years ago, I have remained largely silent on the public stage. I am speaking out now because I feel our government has crossed the red line between properly protecting our national security and trying to gain partisan political advantage."