Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies by Walter L. Perry, John Gordon IV

RAND Monograph

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. Beyond the experience in these two countries, it is likely that U.S. forces will face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies that are unwilling to engage in conventional combat with U.S. forces. This suggests the need for a well-structured systems analysis process to address the insurgent threat as it is evolving in Iraq and Afghanistan and to assist in the development of more-general approaches to such
threats in future campaigns.

This monograph presents a broad range of analytic techniques that can be used to support the security portion of counterinsurgency operations. Its purpose is not to discuss the broader elements of counterinsurgency, such as nation-building and improvements to governance in nations threatened with insurgency. Instead, it combines research supporting two complementary studies: one focused on ways to improve U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities and a second aimed at developing
operational analysis techniques to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The first study provides a framework for thinking about the nature of an insurgency and the latter then examines operational analysis techniques to answer the operational and tactical counterinsurgency questions that evolve at each stage in the insurgency.
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The Critical Thinking Community

Videos:

Critical Thinking - Standards of Thought - Part 1
Critical Thinking - Standards of Thought - Part 2
Critical Thinking and the Basic Elements of Thought

Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. DIA Occasional Paper #14
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How to Spot a Liar: Why People Don't Tell the Truth And How You Can Catch Them by Gregory Hartley

What if you could tell someone was lying, just by listening to them, and observing their action and behavior?

Author Greg Hartley is a decorated military interrogator who has used the techniques in How to Spot a Liar for 16 years to get the truth from enemy combatants. He has successfully applied them to project management and in contract negotiations, to resolve conflict and prevail. Now he shares this scientific process with you so you can use it every day.

Gregory Hartley's expertise as an interrogator first earned him honors with the U.S. Army. More recently, it has drawn organizations such as the CIA and national TV to seek his insights about "how to" as well as "why."




Pamela Meyer: How to spot a liar On any given day we're lied to from 10 to 200 times, and the clues to detect those lie can be subtle and counter-intuitive. Pamela Meyer, author of Liespotting, shows the manners and "hotspots" used by those trained to recognize deception -- and she argues honesty is a value worth preserving.
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The Facial Action Coding System (FACS)

The Facial Action Coding System (FACS) by Paul Ekman, Wallace V. Friesen, and Joseph C. Hager is a method for measuring facial behaviors. It illustrates appearance changes of the face using written descriptions, still images, and digital video examples. FACS, a coding of the 43 facial muscles, was revised in 2002, and is used by professionals such as psychologists, psychiatrists, neurologists, all over the world.

FACS has had a significant impact on research methods used to study the face, nonverbal communication, and emotion . When people make faces--whether spontaneous and concealed emotions - microexpressions, or deliberate contortions--they engage muscles around the eyes, mouth, nose and forehead. With FACS, Ekman and Friesen detailed which muscles move during which facial expressions. Working through the exercises of the FACS Manual may also enable greater awareness of and sensitivity to subtle facial behaviors that could be useful for psychotherapists, interviewers, and other practitioners who must penetrate deeply into interpersonal communications.

Institutions such as the CIA, FBI MI6, and Scotland Yard, have repeatedly invited Paul Ekman to give his opinion or training workshops in “face reading” techniques. Some of the research is presented in the white papers: A Few Can Catch a Liar, and Why don't we Catch Liars?

The FACS Manual, Investigator's Guide, multimedia files, and computer program are available in eBook (PDF) format on a CD ROM. You can read a detailed description of the FACS product and/or read an HTML version of the first two chapters of the FACS Manual and the first five chapters of the Investigator's Guide. The books on CD work with most computers (see System Support for compatibility guidelines). You can buy the new version of Facial Action Coding System online.

Videos: Emotions Revealed KQED QUEST
Face to Face: The Science of Reading Faces

Test your skill: Can you detect a fake smile?

Battelle FAST
RealaeR Hostile Intent
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Technical Surveillance / Spyware

The FBI's Digital Collection System Network (DCSNet), is a point-and-click surveillance system that can perform instant wiretaps on almost any communications device in the US. DCSNet allows instant access to all cellphone, landline, SMS communications anywhere in the US from a point-and-click interface.

Carnivore (DCS-1000) was a software-based surveillance tool used to examine all Internet Protocol (IP) packets and record only those packets or packet segments that meet very specific parameters. The Carnivore software system was used together with a tap on ISP networks to “intercept, filter, seize, and decipher digital communications on the Internet”. The system was described as a “specialized network analyzer” that works by “sniffing” a network and copying and storing a warranted subset of its traffic. The Red Hook (DCS-3000) system has replaced Carnivore.

Red Hook, handles pen-registers and trap-and-traces, a type of surveillance that collects signaling information -- primarily the numbers dialed from a telephone -- but no communications content. (Pen registers record outgoing calls; trap-and-traces record incoming calls.)

DCS-6000, known as Digital Storm, captures and collects the content of phone calls and text messages for full wiretap orders.

Source: US DOJ CALEA IG Report March 2006

COTS software: Pen-Link/LINCOLN software and systems let you collect and record intercepted communications of any type - wireline, wireless, VoIP, 3G and IP. Pen-Link also automatically load various formatted call, IP, and transaction records from a wide variety of communication and Internet service providers to databases. Pen-Link provides a robust case database to store, retrieve and visualize all case intelligence. IP session data and content are easily collected, stored, decoded, and reassembled into meaningful reports to visualize what a surveillance target is doing on the Internet. Pen-Link software provides a comprehensive suite of user-defined analytical reports and graphical analysis tools for Link Charting, Timelines, Frequency Graphics, and GIS Location Mapping.

Oasis is software developed by the CIA that converts audio signals into readable and searchable text. It is designed to analyze an audio signal such as a cellphone call in order to identify and label each speaker (Male 1, Male 2, Female 1, and so forth). Oasis is also able to intelligently reference terms, such as by linking "car bomb" with "terrorism". Oasis recognizes key languages such as Arabic, Chinese, etc. COTS: Dragon Naturally Speaking

Magic Lantern is a keystroke logging software which can be installed remotely, via an e-mail attachment or by exploiting common operating system vulnerabilities using backdoors such as: Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K), NetBus, or Sub7 and installing Internet monitoring software. Countermeasure: Antikeylogging encryption software.


Technical Surveillance Counter-Measures (TSCM):
RF Surveillance Detection. Winkleman UK Microscan MS3000


  • 3.5, 2.4 and 1.2 GHz covert cameras and bugs
  • 2.4, 1.8, and 0.9 GHz cell phones and wireless phones
  • 300-400 MHz walkie-talkies, car keys and garage door openers
  • 70-150 MHz FM transmission
  • 49 MHz bugs
  • 27 MHz citizen-band transmissions
Non-linear Junction Detector(NLJD) for detection of hidden electronics, Cellular phone 'Roving bug' , Smartphone Monitoring, Cellular Detectors, Cellular Jammers, RF Jammer

Kingfisher Fibre Optical Microphones
Electret condenser microphone
Audio Transmitters, Nearfield Receivers
Stethoscopes
Laser Microphone Defeater
Wireless Webcam, IR Camera, IR Webcam , Remote sensing and sytems control using cellular phone
1.2GHz/2.4GHz Camera jammer
Pinole and Microchip Cameras, Mobilephone zoom ,Camera phone scan/copy/fax
GPS Tracking Jammer : Anti-GPS Jammer Store
Mobile phone tracking


TSCM Handbook, and other recommended publications.
FM 34-60 Counterintelligence
JCIX

Cellular Telephone Exploitation:
LogicCube CellDEX
Cellebrite
Micro Systemation GSM XRY
Paraben Device Seizure
SIMIS

Media Exploitation:
Low Level:

Blackbird Data Surveyor/Scavenger
ADF Triage-G2

EnCase Portable


High Level:

Digital Intelligence FRED-L
High Tech Crime Institute EDAS FOX
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Using Prediction Markets to Enhance US Intelligence Capabilities by Puong Fei Yeh

In 2001, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) started experimenting with methods for applying market-based concepts to intelligence. One such project, DARPA’s Future Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP) program tested whether prediction markets, markets in which people bet on the likelihood of future events, could be used to improve upon existing approaches to preparing strategic intelligence.

The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive by Robin Hanson
Congressional Record: July 29, 2003 (Senate)
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Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer by Viktor Cherkashin and Gregory Feifer

Victor Cherkashin's incredible career in the KGB spanned thirty-eight years, from Stalin's death in 1953 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this riveting memoir, Cherkashin provides a remarkable insider's view of the KGB's prolonged conflict with the United States, from his recruitment through his rising career in counterintelligence to his prime spot as the KGB's number- two man at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Victor Cherkashin's story will shed stark new light on the KGB's inner workings over four decades and reveal new details about its major cases. Cherkashin's story is rich in episode and drama. He took part in some of the highest-profile Cold War cases, including tracking down U.S. and British spies around the world. He was posted to stations in the U.S., Australia, India, and Lebanon and traveled the globe for operations in England, Europe, and the Middle East. But it was in 1985, known as "the Year of the Spy," that Cherkashin scored two of the biggest coups of the Cold War. In April of that year, he recruited disgruntled CIA officer Aldrich Ames, becoming his principal handler. Refuting and clarifying other published versions, Cherkashin will offer the most complete account on how and why Ames turned against his country. Cherkashin will also reveal new details about Robert Hanssen's recruitment and later exposure, as only he can. And he will address whether there is an undiscovered KGB spy-another Hanssen or Ames-still at large. Spy Handler will be a major addition to Cold War history, told by one of its key participants.

Book review by John Ehrman, CIA Directorate of Intelligence.

Victor Cherkashin, a retired KGB colonel, was awarded the prestigious Order of Lenin. During his four decades working for the KGB, he was stationed at various times in West Germany, India, Australia, Lebanon, and Washington, D.C. Following his retirement, he began a private security company in Russia, which he still runs. He lives in Moscow. Gregory Feifer holds a B.A. and an M.A. in Russian Studies from Harvard. A former Radio Free Europe Moscow correspondent, Feifer lived in Russia from 1998 to 2003. He covered Russian politics for a number of publications, including the Moscow Times, World Policy Journal, and Agence France-Presse. He lives in New York City.

Running a Ring of Spies: Spycraft and Black Operations in the Real World of Espionage by Jefferson Mack
FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations
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Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying by James M. Olson

Revolutionary War officer Nathan Hale, one of America’s first spies, said, “Any kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary.” A statue of Hale stands outside CIA headquarters, and the agency often cites his statement as one of its guiding principles. But who decides what is necessary for the public good, and is it really true that any kind of service is permissible for the public good?

These questions are at the heart of James M. Olson’s book, Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying. Olson, a veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service, takes readers inside the real world of intelligence to describe the difficult dilemmas that field officers face on an almost daily basis. Far from being a dry theoretical treatise, this fascinating book uses actual intelligence operations to illustrate how murky their moral choices can be. Readers will be surprised to learn that the CIA provides very little guidance on what is, or is not, permissible. Rather than empowering field officers, the author has found that this lack of guidelines actually hampers operations. Olson believes that U.S. intelligence officers need clearer moral guidelines to make correct, quick decisions. Significantly, he believes these guidelines should come from the American public, not from closed-door meetings inside the intelligence community. Fair Play will encourage a broad public debate about the proper moral limits on U.S. intelligence activities.
Book review by David Robarge
Scenarios “taken from the real world of espionage and covert action…[that] raise moral issues that US intelligence practitioners currently face or could conceivably face in the future.” :
1. Homosexual Blackmail
2. Trojan Horse
3. False Flag
4. Hit Team
5. Torture
6. Kidnapping and Torture by Surrogates
7. Truth Serum
8. Journalism Cover
9. Operational Use of Journalists
10. Human Rights Violators
11. Torture Training
12. Humanitarian Aid Worker Cover
13. Missionary Cover
14. Operational Use of Academics
15. P-Sources (Professors)
16. Prostitute for Terrorist
17. Child Prostitute
18. Terrorist Act for Bona Fides
19. Election Tampering
20. Seduction and Compromise
21. Romeo Operations
22. Coercive Pitch
23. Feeding a Drug Habit
24. Kidnapping or Killing a Defector
25. Fabricating Evidence
26. L-Devices (lethal)
27. Insertion Operations
28. Fake Diagnosis
29. Drugging a Foreign Diplomat
30. Press Placements
31. Fabricating Academic Credentials
32. Plagiarizing a Ph.D. Dissertation
33. Exposing Unwitting Person to Risk
34. Kamikaze Dolphins
35. Spying on Americans Overseas
36. Spying on Friends
37. Spying on the United Nations
38. Industrial Espionage
39. Bribing a Foreign Government
40. Tampering with U.S. Mail
41. Protection of Code Breaking
42. Breaking a Promise to an Agent
43. Unauthorized Cover
44. Bogus Websites and Chatrooms
45. Back Doors
46. Biological Attack
47. Forging Documents from Friendly Countries
48. Collateral Damage
49. Foreign Officer Visitors
50. Interrogation
James M. Olson is on the faculty of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where he teaches courses on intelligence and national security. He served his entire career in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. His career highlights include serving as the chief of CIA counterintelligence at CIA headquarters and in overseas assignments in Moscow, Vienna, and Mexico City. He lives in College Station, Texas.
Just War, Ethics, and Terror CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence
An Ordinary Spy by Joseph Weisberg
The Honourable Schoolboy by John le Carre
Smiley's People by John le Carre
Ashenden by W. Somerset Maugham
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How to Break A Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq by Matthew Alexander

Finding Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, had long been the U.S. military's top priority — trumping even the search for Osama bin Laden. No brutality was spared in trying to squeeze intelligence from Zarqawi's suspected associates. But these "force on force" techniques yielded exactly nothing, and, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the military rushed a new breed of interrogator to Iraq.

Matthew Alexander, a former criminal investigator and head of a handpicked interrogation team, gives us the first inside look at the U.S. military's attempt at more civilized interrogation techniques — and their astounding success. The intelligence coup that enabled the June 7, 2006, air strike on Zarqawi's rural safe house was the result of several keenly strategized interrogations, none of which involved torture or even "control" tactics.

Matthew and his team decided instead to get to know their opponents. Who were these monsters? Who were they working for? What were they trying to protect? Every day the "'gators" matched wits with a rogues' gallery of suspects brought in by Special Forces ("door kickers"): egomaniacs, bloodthirsty adolescents, opportunistic stereo repairmen, Sunni clerics horrified by the sectarian bloodbath, Al Qaeda fanatics, and good people in the wrong place at the wrong time. With most prisoners, negotiation was possible and psychological manipulation stunningly effective. But Matthew's commitment to cracking the case with these methods sometimes isolated his superiors and put his own career at risk.

This account is an unputdownable thriller — more of a psychological suspense story than a war memoir. And indeed, the story reachesfar past the current conflict in Iraq with a reminder that we don't have to become our enemy to defeat him. Matthew Alexander and his ilk, subtle enough and flexible enough to adapt to the challenges of modern, asymmetrical warfare, have proved to be our best weapons against terrorists all over the world.

Matthew Alexander served for fourteen years in the U.S. Air Force. He has personally conducted more than three hundred interrogations and supervised more than a thousand. He was awarded the Bronze Star for his achievements in Iraq.
Writers Guide to Character Traits by Dr. Linda Edelstein
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Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship - Rountable Report June 2004

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Making the Analytic Review Process Work by Martin Peterson

The Challenge for the Intelligence Analyst by Martin Peterson

Integrating Methodologists into Teams of Substantive Experts by Rob Johnston

Developing a Taxonomy of Intelligence Analysis Variables by Rob Johnston

Supporting US Foreign Policy in the Post 9/11 World by Richard N. Haass

What to Do When Traditional Models Fail: The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis by Carmen A. Medina

Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis: A Counterpoint to "The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis" by Steven R. Ward

Ways to Make Analysis Relevant but not Prescriptive by Fulton T. Armstrong
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National Intelligence Estimates by Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations

A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) represents the U.S. intelligence community’s most authoritative and coordinated written assessment of a specific national-security issue.

CIA NIE: Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program's (October 2002)

DNI NIE: Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States (April 2006)

DNI NIE: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (July 2007)

DNI NIE: Prospect for Iraq's Stability: Some Security progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive (August 2007)

National Intelligence Council NIE - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (November 2007)

CRS Report for Congress: Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress? (December 14, 2007)

CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence: The Making of an NIE
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Bayesian Analysis for Intelligence by Nicholas Schweitzer

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Collecting the Dots: Problem Formulation and Solution Elements by Martin C. Libicki and Shari Lawrence Pfleeger, RAND Corporation

Across a wide variety of endeavors—from homeland security to foreign intelligence, criminal investigation, public health, and system safety—failure to anticipate disaster has been ascribed to the inability to “connect the dots.” This paper argues that to “connect the dots,” one must first “collect the dots.” All too often, the inability to foresee trouble has come about because pieces of information sit in this or that head. Were they combined, trouble would be easier to foresee,
but when each stands alone, no compelling conclusions suggest themselves. This paper investigates some of the barriers to circulating telltale information and describes some approaches—institutional, social, and technological—that would begin to bring information together in a meaningful way.

The prevailing view in the intelligence and public safety communities is that forestalling major threats such as terrorist attacks or epidemics requires weaving together disconnected pieces of information to reveal broader patterns; in more common terms, we call this “connecting the dots.” In this paper, we argue that connecting the dots is less likely to happen unless one takes a prior step: “collecting the dots,” that is, bringing scattered pieces of information into some proximity to each other to enable pattern recognition. This paper is intended to help decisionmakers understand the dimensions of solving the problem of “collecting the dots.” Any solution involves identifying what information is important and improving its circulation within communities that are in a position to connect the dots so collected. The paper describes organizational and informational barriers to “collecting the dots” and explores the characteristics of potential solutions to overcoming them.
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The Secrets of Economic Indicators by Bernard Baumohl

"Whether you're tracking pop culture, high fashion or health care, all things are connected, and economics is the tie that binds them all. For those who need to know more about economic trends and for those who haven't the skills or background in the field, Mr. Baumohl's book is the real deal. He miraculously breathes life into economic indicators and statistics." - The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2005:

"Baumohl, a former economics reporter for Time magazine, has written a tremendously useful source on economic indicators. Baumohl considers a variety of factors when describing each indicator, such as what exactly it measures, how it is computed, where to find the relevant report on the web, the day and time this report is released, the source of the information, and how often the information is revised. He also discusses the market impact of these indicators on bonds, stocks, and currency. Bottom Line: Although this book is marketed as a tool for investors and is not organized like a typical reference book, it belongs in the reference collection because it explains so clearly what the various economic indicators are and how to locate data about them. Recommended for all libraries. " —Stacey Marien, American Univ. Lib., Washington, DC

Technical Analysis of Financial Markets by John Murphy

Economist Intelligence Unit
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