The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture by Ishmael Jones

American Presidents make decisions on war unaware that the human source intelligence provided by the CIA is often false or nonexistent. From Harry Truman during the Korean War to George Bush during the War on Terror, modern Presidents have faced their darkest moments as a result of poor intelligence. The CIA has assured Congress and the President that intelligence programs in hostile areas of the world are thriving, when they simply do not exist.

The CIA is a broken, Soviet-style bureaucracy with its own agenda: to consume federal funds, to expand within the United States, to feign activity, and to enrich current and former employees. After 9/11, billions of dollars directed by Congress to increase the number of officers working under deep cover on foreign streets have disappeared without the CIA fielding a single additional, productive officer overseas.

The Human Factor makes the case for intelligence reform, showing the career of an accomplished deep cover CIA case officer who struggled not with finding human sources of secret information in rogue nations, but with the CIA's bloated, dysfunctional, even cancerous bureaucracy. After initial training in the US, Ishmael Jones spent his career in multiple, consecutive overseas assignments, as a deep cover officer without benefit of diplomatic immunity. In dingy hotel rooms, Jones met alone with weapons scientists, money launderers, and terrorists. He pushed intelligence missions forward while escaping purges within the Agency, active thwarting of operations by bureaucrats, and the ever-present threat of arrest by hostile foreign intelligence services. Jones became convinced that the CIA's failure to fulfill its purpose endangers Americans. Attempting reform from within proved absurd. Jones resigned from the CIA to make a public case for reform through the writing of this book.

Effective American organizations feature clear missions, streamlined management, transparency, and accountability. The CIA has none of these. While it has always hired good people, it wastes and even perverts employees. The CIA is not doing its job and must be fixed. Until it is, our lives and the lives of our allies are in jeopardy.

After spending decades as an agent to the CIA, Ishmael Jones unravels the blunders and grave mistakes the US has made over the years. Jones conveys a true feel for the facts of real clandestine work. He tells his story straight, with dry wit, and takes personal blame where blame is due. Recently leaving the CIA to write this memoir, and with additional edits to conceal identities, the CIA has approved its publication.

Ishmael Jones, a pseudonym, was born in the United States and raised in the Middle East, East Asia, and East Africa. He attended universities in the US and served as an officer in the US Marine Corps. In the late 1980’s he joined the Central Intelligence Agency where he served as a deep cover officer focusing on human sources with access to intelligence on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. His assignments included more than 15 years of continuous overseas service in numerous exotic countries and several rogue nations. He resigned from the CIA in good standing.

Spies For Hire, The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing, by Tim Shorrock

Even James Bond is temping these days. According to investigative journalist Shorrock, the CIA and other intelligence agencies now have more contractors working for them than they do spies of their own. Often former staff hired back at double or triple their former government salaries, these private contractors do everything from fighting in Afghanistan to interrogating prisoners, aiming spy satellites and supervising secret agents. Shorrock gives a comprehensive—at times eye-glazing—rundown of the players in the industry, and his book is valuable for its detailed panorama of 21st-century intelligence work. He uncovers serious abuses—contractor CACI International figured prominently in the Abu Ghraib outrages—and nagging concerns about corrupt ties between intelligence officials and private corporations, industry lobbying for a national surveillance state, the withering of the intelligence agencies' in-house capacities and the displacement of an ethos of public service by a profit motive. However, the bulk of the outsourcing Shorrock unearths is rather pedestrian, involving the management of mundane IT systems and various administrative services, and this exposé insinuates more skullduggery than it demonstrates.

Managing the Private Spies: Use of Commercial Augmentation for Intelligence Operations by Glenn J. Voelz

Delfly Micro Air Vehicle (MAV)

The DelFly is a Micro Air Vehicle (MAV), an extremely small, remote-controlled aircraft with an on-board camera that transmits images through a transmitter to a ground station. The DelFly Micro only weighs 3 grams and has a size of 10 cm from wing tip to wing tip. The camera transmits TV quality image signals to a ground station and therefore allows the DelFly to be operated remotely by an operator from a computer. It can be maneuvered using a joystick as if the operator was actually in the cockpit of the aircraft. Such ultra-small, remote-controlled, camera-equipped aircraft could be eventually used for observation flights in difficult-to-reach or dangerous areas.


2008 Failed States Index

Source: Foreign Policy / Fund for Peace

Whether it is an unexpected food crisis or a devastating hurricane, the world’s weakest states are the most exposed when crisis strikes. In the fourth annual Failed States Index, FOREIGN POLICY and The Fund for Peace rank the countries where state collapse may be just one disaster away.

Further details on the methodology of the Foreign Policy/Fund for Peace Failed States Index, as well as the results of earlier Failed States Indexes, can be found at ForeignPolicy.com and on the Web site of the Fund for Peace, fundforpeace.org.

In Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart attempt to map out practical solutions to problems such as aid waste and lack of accountability in the world’s most vulnerable states. William Easterly offers a scathing indictment of aid efforts in weak states in The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). The foundation of African entrepreneur and philanthropist Mo Ibrahim recently released the inaugural Ibrahim Index of African Governance, which rates the quality of governance on the continent and aims to hold leaders to account.

Use and Perception of Violence: A Girardian Approach to Asymmetric Warfare by Raphael Baeriswyl

This essay is based on a paper presented at a conference on "The moral dimension of asymmetrical warfare" organised by the Faculty of Military Sciences and the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands. It combines René Girard’s theses on societal violence with the latest analyses of those modern conflicts which strategists call "asymmetric." The Western military may find in Girardian anthropology an explanation for the accrued difficulty that they meet in their missions on modern battlefields. The application of René Girard’s theses to modern warfare provides anthropologists with further evidence of the validity of these theses. More broadly, this essay challenges the relativism that has developed in Western society over the last three centuries.

My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing by Christoph Reuter

What kind of people are suicide bombers? How do they justify their actions? In this meticulously researched and sensitively written book, journalist Christoph Reuter argues that popular views of these young men and women--as crazed fanatics or brainwashed automatons--fall short of the mark. In many cases these modern-day martyrs are well-educated young adults who turn themselves into human bombs willingly and eagerly--to exact revenge on a more powerful enemy, perceived as both unjust and oppressive. Suicide assassins are determined to make a difference, for once in their lives, no matter what the cost. As Reuter's many interviews with would-be martyrs, their trainers, friends, and relatives reveal, the bombers are motivated more by how they expect to be remembered--as heroic figures--than by religion-infused visions of a blissful life to come.

Reuter, who spent eight years researching the book, moves from the broken survivors of the childrens' suicide brigades in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, to the war-torn Lebanon of Hezbollah, to Israeli-occupied Palestinian land, and to regions as disparate as Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and Kurdistan. He tells a disturbing story of the modern globalization of suicide bombing--orchestrated, as his own investigations have helped to establish, by the shadowy Al Qaeda network and unintentionally enabled by wrong-headed policies of Western governments. In a final, hopeful chapter, Reuter points to today's postrevolutionary, post-Khomeini Iran, where a new social environment renounces the horrific practice in the very place where it was enthusiastically embraced just decades ago.

Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis by Gregory F. Treverton, C. Bryan Gabbard

RAND Corporation Technical Report

Most public discussions of intelligence address operations—the work of spymasters and covert operators. Current times, in the wake of September 11th and the intelligence failure in the runup to the war in Iraq, are different.1 Intelligence analysis has become the subject. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission was direct, and damning, about intelligence analysis before the Iraq war: “This failure was in large part the result of analytical shortcomings; intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam’s intentions.” To be sure, in the Iraq case, what the United States did or did not collect, and how reliable its sources were, were also at issue. And the focus of post mortems on pre-September 11th was, properly, mainly on relations between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and on the way the FBI did its work. But in both cases, analysis was also central. How do the various agencies perform the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, not just of spying or operations? How is that task different now, in the world of terrorism, especially Islamic Jihadist terrorism, than in the older world of the Cold War and the Soviet Union?

The difference is dramatic and that difference is the theme of this report. The United States Government asked RAND to interview analysts at the agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community and ask about the current state of analysis. How do those analytic agencies think of their task? In particular, what initiatives are they taking to build capacity, and what are the implicit challenges on which those initiatives are based? Our charter was broad enough to allow us to include speculations about the future of analysis, and this report includes those speculations. This report is a work in progress because many issues—the state of tradecraft and of training and the use of technology and formal methods—cry out for further study. This report was long delayed in the clearance process. It has been updated and remains a useful baseline in assessing progress as the Intelligence Community confronts the enormous challenges
it faces.

Microsoft Gives Out Back Door Key

Last Summer, Microsoft Corporation quietly introduced a powerful tool for getting past security on laptops and PCs running the Windows operations system (which about 90 percent do). The device is a USB thumb drive called COFEE (Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor). When you capture an enemy computer, you plug in COFEE and then use over a hundred software to quickly get whatever information is on the machine. COFEE can quickly reveal passwords, decrypt files, reveal recent Internet activity and much more. A lot of this can be done without COFEE, but with the Microsoft device, intelligence collection is a lot faster.

Microsoft has distributed thousands of COFEE devices to police and military intelligence personnel in the United States, and some foreign countries. COFEE was developed mainly to assist the investigation of Internet based crime. But military intelligence operators find it very useful in uncovering enemy plans.

COFEE is a USB drive that allows law enforcement to run more than 150 commands on a live computer system and save the results on the portable drive for later analysis. This preserves valuable information that could be lost if the computer had to be shut down and transported to a lab--files that are stored in active memory would otherwise be lost, for example.

COFEE was developed in 2006 by Ricci Ieong and Anthony Fung, both members of the High Tech Crime Investigators Associate's (HTCIA) Asia South Pacific Chapter. Fung now works for Microsoft's Internet Safety Enforcement team in Hong Kong and used to be on the police force there. Ieong is founder and principal consultant for eWalker Consulting.

COFEE consists of plain text scripts; the data collected from these scripts is routed to a provided USB drive. Although intended for use with a command line, there is also an option for GUI. Raw text captures generate either SH1 or md5 checksums. The results for an acquisition are then presented in either plain text or HTML. Each operation produces its own log file to help investigators.

Although Microsoft would not confirm any specific tools included within COFEE, it did say that all the tools were publicly available. A quick search by CNET revealed several free Windows-based digital forensic tool kits available for download. These include:

Several news reports have suggested that Microsoft is also providing law enforcement with new tools to defeat BitLocker in Windows Vista or access to a secret back door within Windows. A Microsoft spokesperson denied this, saying, "COFEE does not circumvent Windows Vista BitLocker encryption or undermine any protections in Windows through secret 'backdoors' or other undocumented means." Microsoft also stressed that COFEE is still in beta.

"The key to COFEE is not new forensic tools," said Tim Cranton, associate general counsel for Microsoft, "but rather the creation of an easy to use, automated forensic tool at the scene. It's the ease of use, speed, and consistency of evidence extraction that is key."

More than 2,000 officials are using it worldwide, according to Microsoft.


Q&A with Tim Cranton, Associate General COunsel for Microsoft at the Law Enforcement Technology 2008 conference: Microsoft Calls on Global Public-Private Partnerships to Help in the Fight Against Cybercrime

Media Exploitation:

Low Level:

Blackbird Data Surveyor/Scavenger
ADF Triage-G2
EnCase Portable

High Level:

Digital Intelligence FRED-L
High Tech Crime Institute EDAS FOX

A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century by Jeffrey T. Richelson

Here is the ultimate inside history of the role of modern intelligence across the globe. Unrivaled in its scope and as readable as any spy novel, A Century of Spies travels from tsarist Russia and the earliest days of the British Secret Service to the crises and uncertainties of today's post-Cold War world. From spies and secret agencies to the latest high-tech wizardry in signals and imagery intelligence, it provides fascinating in-depth coverage of important operations of the United States, British, Russian, Israeli, Chinese, German, and French intelligence services, and much more.

All the key elements of modern intelligence activity are here. An expert whose books have received high marks from the intelligence and military communities, Jeffrey Richelson covers the crucial role of spy technology from the days of Marconi and the Wright Brothers to today's dazzling array of Space Age satellites, aircraft, and ground stations. He provides vivid portraits of spy-masters, spies, and defectors--including Sideny Reilly, Herbert Yardley, Kim Philby, James Angleton, Markus Wolf, Reinhard Gehlen, Vitaly Yurchenko, Jonathan Pollard, and many others. Richelson paints a colorful portrait of World War I's spies and saboteurs, and illuminates the secret maneuvering that helped determine the outcome of the war on land, at sea, and on the diplomatic front; he investigates the enormous importance of intelligence operations in both the European and Pacific theaters in World War II, from the work of Allied and Nazi agents to the "black magic" of U.S. and British code breakers; and he gives us a complete overview of intelligence during the length of the Cold War, from superpower espionage and spy scandals to covert action and secret wars. A final chapter probes the still-evolving role of intelligence work in the new world of disorder and ethnic conflict, from the high-tech wonders of the Gulf War to the surprising involvement of the French government in industrial espionage.

Comprehensive, authoritative, and addictively readable, A Century of Spies is filled with new information on a variety of subjects--from the activities of the American Black Chamber in the 1920s to intelligence collection during the Cuban Missile Crisis to Soviet intelligence and covert action operations. It is an essential volume for anyone interested in military history, espionage and adventure, and world affairs.
Jeffrey T. Richelson is a Senior Fellow of the National Security Archive and the author of many books on intelligence including America's Secret Eyes in Space, The U.S. Intelligence Community, and Sword and Shield: The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus.

(U) Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Data Mining Report

This February 15, 2008 report covers the data mining activities of all elements of the ODNI.

Confronting context effects in Intelligence Analysis: How can Mathematics Help? by Keith Devlin

Abstract: We use the interpretation of a key piece of information in the 2002 U.S. decision to invade Iraq to motivate a study of the role of context in decision making. Although our primary focus is intelligence analysis, our study seeks to adopt a mathematical approach. This should make it applicable in a wide variety of application domains. In particular, the level of abstraction at which we work enables us to make useful comparisons between data gathering for intelligence analysis and Internet commerce, both of which depend on making crucial estimates of trust.

The initial examination of the way context influences reasoning and decision making, together with the results of studies carried out by others (some of which we mention), leads us to conclude that the role played by mathematics in improving intelligence analysis will necessarily be different from the role it plays in engineering or the natural sciences. Whereas some aspects of our study may find their way into the design of computer support tools for intelligence analysis — for instance the logical formalism we described in our earlier paper — we believe that the most significant benefits to intelligence analysis from this work are likely to be:

• better appreciation of the way context influences reasoning and decision making;
• sharper insight into the human problems inherent in intelligence analysis;
• improved analysis protocols to guide the intelligence analysis community.

In this respect, our study may be viewed as a mathematical analog of Richards J Heuer’s Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, a work on which we draw.

(U) CIA Strategic Roadmap: General Hayden, Director, CIA

Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. January 11, 2007

CIA Strategic Intent 2007-2011

Can New Technology and Tradecraft Enhance Intelligence Sharing and National Security?

Council on Foreign Relations VideoSpeakers: Calvin Andrus, Chief Technology Officer, Center for Mission Innovation, Central Intelligence Agency
Stephen DeAngelis, Founder, President and CEO, Enterra Solutions
Presider: Michael Moran, Executive Editor, Cfr.org

Global Stress Points Matrix™

The Global Stress Point Matrix™ provides a methodology for identifying and measuring events (stress points). It monitors the drivers and restrainers tending towards or against the event occurring.

Unlikely but foreseeable events can have important financial, strategic and political impacts on your organisation – particularly if you’re not prepared for them! Oxford Analytica has developed an Early Warning system to meet exactly these needs, which is called the Global Stress Point Matrix (GSPM)™.


The core of GSPM is a unique methodology that allows its users to be kept informed about political and economic surprises and threats, which although they may appear unlikely, would have severe consequences should they occur. It is a disciplined approach for ‘stepping outside conventional wisdom’, using Oxford Analytica’s global network of experts to ‘ask the right questions’.


The standard GSPM service currently monitors the 20 events that Oxford Analytica’s experts consider to be potentially the most disruptive to a broad range of clients. It estimates the impact of these events on:

  • global GDP
  • business operations
  • geopolitics
  • international financial markets.