Advising Indigenous Forces by Robert D. Ramsey III

Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper (OP) 18: Among the key points Mr. Ramsey makes are the need for US advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to adapt US organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions. Accordingly, he also notes the great importance of the host nation’s leadership buying into and actively supporting the development of a performance-based selection, training, and promotion system.
Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present CSI Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper (OP) 19

Other CSI Publications

Analyst Predicts Muslim Majority in Russia Within 30 Years

A leading specialist on ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation says within the next several decades Russia will become a country with a Muslim majority.

Until December 2006, Paul Goble was vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. While there, he launched the “Window on Eurasia” series which at that time he distributed directly via e-mail. Prior to joining the faculty there in 2004, he served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He writes frequently on ethnic and religious issues and has edited five volumes on ethnicity and religion in the former Soviet space. Trained at Miami University in Ohio and the University of Chicago, he has been decorated by the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for his work in promoting Baltic independence and the withdrawal of Russian forces from those formerly occupied lands.

Publications by Paul A. Goble

The War of Ideas by Dr. Whalid Phares

From Afghanistan and Iraq to Europe and the United States we are engaged in one of the most heated wars of all time. In this incisive new book, the man that has been called--the only one to understand the mind of the jihadist--shows that the most important battle is actually taking place in the hearts and minds of the world's population. This is the war of ideas, where ideology is the most powerful weapon of all. Phares explores the beliefs of two opposing camps, one standing for democracy and human rights, and the other rejecting the idea of an international community and calling for jihad against the West. He reveals the strategies of both sides, explaining that new technologies and the growing media savvy of the jihadists have raised the stakes in the conflict. And most urgently, he warns that the West is in danger of losing the war, for whereas debate and theorizing rarely translate into action here, ideas and deeds are inextricably linked for the forces of jihad.

The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy: Lecture at the Heritage Foundation (Video)
Interview (Video) on C-Span's Washington Journal: "Jihadism and the War of Ideas"

Jihad U: The Saudi Fifth Column in our Nation's Campuses by Lee Kaplan

Military Strategy by COL John M. Collins

-Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (1997-2000 "John Collins has written a brilliant and thorough work.... This should be the text on military strategy."

-Hon. Ike Skelton, Ranking Minority Member, House Armed Services Committee "Collins is truly one of the rare strategic thinkers of our day."

John M. Collins is a retired U.S. Army colonel and a distinguished visiting research fellow at the National Defense University. Collins culminated his military career as the director of military strategy studies and then as chief of the Strategic Research Group at the National War College. He was subsequently the senior specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service for twenty-four years.

Military Geography by COL John M. Collins, US Army (Ret.)

John M. Collins has long been recognized in military and political circles as a strategist and thinker of profound depth. This, his latest offering, is the crown jewel in his intellectual diadem. His subject, military geography, is a discipline that affects everything soldiers do, every day, everywhere. All too often, it has been the difference between victory and defeat, yet no subject has been treated with more benign neglect in institutional and personal military education.

This book is also an effective text for civilian geographers. The author's orientation toward things military in no way distracts from the book's usefulness to professional geographers.
In a short introduction, Collins states that his purpose in writing the book was:
  • To provide a textbook for academic use.

  • To provide a handbook for use by military professionals.

  • To enhance public appreciation for the impact of geography on military affairs.
Few authors have achieved these purposes as well as John Collins. Following a brief overview of the discipline, part one analyzes physical geography. Included in this section are the natural aspects of military geography: spatial relationships, the lay of the land, oceans and seashores, the Earth's atmosphere, regional peculiarities, inner and outer space, and natural resources and raw materials.

Part two describes cultural geography--subjects such as populations, urbanization, lines of communication, military bases, and fortresses and field fortifications. This section of the book is extremely well-organized and should be a useful primer for any politician with aspirations for federal political office.

Part three includes the political-military relationships of geography, such as military service predilections, geopolitical functions and military areas of responsibility. This last subject is particularly interesting. The Unified Command Plan (which delineates these areas) was revised in March for the first time in some 40 years. Now, that is intellectual stability!

Part four, which offers a format for an area analysis and then provides two operations requiring an area analysis, is an essential and useful tool for any considered military effort.

Perhaps the most useful portion of the book is the galaxy of figures, maps, tables and photographs. How many of you have spent countless hours researching some obscure but important geographical point, only to be disappointed with the effort and the result. Collins has made it easy for us with the material he has provided in this book.

Once every decade or so a book appears that fills an immediate requirement. That no one has made such an effort before is further credit to the astute mind of John Collins.

From Beirut to Jerusalem by Thomas L. Friedman

From Beirut to Jerusalem, winner of the 1989 National Book Award for nonfiction, is the startling, intense and thought-provoking account of Thomas L. Friedman's decade of reporting in the strife-ridden Middle East.

Thomas L. Friedman has won two Pulitzer Prizes -- one for his reporting in Beirut and one for reporting in Jerusalem, the two cities at the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict. No two cities have received more headline coverage, nor been more hotly debated, and no reporter has covered them more in depth than Friedman. in his journey from Beirut to Jerusalem, Friedman gives us a panoramic view of both the political and personal conflicts.

As a reporter for UPI and The New York Times, he was stationed in Beirut from 1979 to 1984, and in Lebanon from 1984 to 1989. He describes with intense vividness the sometimes horrifying, sometimes wondrous cities, for which, he says, nothing in his life had prepared him.
Friedman brings alive his journey from Beirut to Jerusalem through anecdotes, history, analysis and self-examination -- and puts all the currents into perspective with inimitable detail, clarity and remarkable insight. This is a much-needed framework for understanding the Middle East, and for understanding the future of this unique region.

FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency

This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years. With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it also must be informed by contemporary experiences.

USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence

In their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency International Crisis Group, Middle East Report. No. 50, 15 February 2006.

Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies, James S. Corum, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2006.

Just War Theory

In order to be just, a war must meet the following criteria before the use of force (jus ad bellum):

  • Just cause: The reason for going to war needs to be just and can therefore be recapturing things taken or punishing people who have done wrong.
  • Comparative justice : While there may be rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, to override the presumption against the use of force, the injustice suffered by one party must significantly outweigh that suffered by the other.
  • Legitimate authority: Only duly constituted public authorities may use deadly force or wage war
  • Right intention: Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose—correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention, while material gain or maintaining economies is not.
  • Probability of success: Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are required to achieve success;
  • Last resort: Force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted.

Once war has begun, just war theory also directs how combatants are to act (Jus in bello):

  • Discrimination: Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of discrimination. The acts of war should be directed towards the inflictors of the wrong, and not towards civilians caught in circumstances they did not create.
  • Proportionality: Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. The force used must be proportional to the wrong endured, and to the possible good that may come.
  • Minimum Force: Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of minimum force. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction. It is different from proportionality because the amount of force proportionate to the goal of the mission might exceed the amount of force necessary to accomplish that mission..

Operational Law Handbook The Operational Law Handbook is a "how to" guide for judge advocates practicing operational law. It provides reference and describes tactics and techniques for the practice of operational law. It supports the doctrinal concepts and principles of the Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10 . The handbook provides information on the legal basis for the use of force, law of war (LOW), human rights, rules of engagement, emergency essential civilians supporting military operations, contingency contractor personnel, foreign and deployment, criminal law, environmental law, fiscal law, deployment contracting and battlefield acquisition, intelligence law and interrogation operations, administrative law, international agreements & SOFAs, legal assistance, combatting terrorism, domestic operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, special operations, civil affairs, air, sea, and space law, detainee operations, reserve component Soldiers and operations, joint operations, military decision making process & operations plans, Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAM), internet websites for operational lawyers.

Law of War Handbook should be a start point for Judge Advocates looking for information on the Law of War. It is the second volume of a three volume set and is to be used in conjunction with the Operational Law Handbook (JA422) and the Documentary Supplement (JA424). The Operational Law Handbook covers the myriad of non-Law of War issues a deployed Judge Advocate may face and the Documentary Supplement reproduces many of the primary source documents referred to in either of the other two volumes. The Law of War Handbook is not a substitute for official references.

Legal Resource links from the USAF Air War College is a free, non-profit, critically annotated aid to philosophical studies of warfare.

"Improving the Fighting Position": A Practioners Guide to Operational Law Support to the Interrogation Process

The Law of War: Can 20th-Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? by LTC David P. Cavaler, US Army (Ret.), Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 9

Cultural Intelligence

"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." - Sun Tzu

"Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I risk myself among them many times, to learn." - T.E. Lawrence

"...the value of military intelligence is exceeded by that of social and cultural intelligence. We need the ability to look, understand, and operate deeply into the fault lines of societies where, increasingly, we find the frontiers of national security."- ADM Arthur Cebrowski, USN, (Ret.), former Director of the Office of Force Transformation.

Does Culture Matter?: The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture
by Montgomery McFate, Joint Forces Quarterly Video

Military Cultural Education by COL Maxie McFarland, U.S. Army (Ret.), Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries by LTC William D. Wunderle, U.S. Army. Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Special Study

Know your Enemy: Human Intelligence Key to SOF Missions by Scott Swanson, Delphi International Research

USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL)

Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions

Five specialists examine the historical relationship of culture and conflict in various regional societies. The authors use Adda B. Bozeman's theories on conflict and culture as the basis for their analyses of the causes, nature, and conduct of war and conflict in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, Sinic Asia (China, Japan, and Vietnam), Latin America, and Africa. Drs. Blank, Lawrence Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers conclude that non-Western cultures and societies do not reject war but look at violence and conflict as a normal and legitimate aspect of sociopolitical behavior.

The Asymmetric Warfare Group

The Asymmetric Warfare Group: Closing the Capability Gaps by Lt. Gen. James J. Lovelace Jr. & Brig. Gen. Joseph L.Votel, U.S. Army

Lt. Gen. James J. Lovelace Jr. is deputy chief of staff, G-3.

Brig. Gen. Joseph L. Votel is the deputy director, Information Operations/director, Army Improvised Explosive Device Task Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3.

This article outlines the vision and mission of the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), currently formed to enhance Army and joint force commanders' abilities to confront and defeat current and future asymmetric threats.

Center for Asymmetric Warfare

Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare
; Colonel Clinton J. Ancker III, U.S. Army (Ret.) Director, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth; and LTC Michael D. Burke, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Asymmetry and US Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts. Steven Metz, and Douglas V. Johnson II. ; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Defining Asymmetric Warfare. MAJ David L. Buffaloe; U.S. Army
Rethinking Asymmetric Threats Stephen Blank; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats. Robert D. Steele; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations By Jamison Jo Medby, Russell W. Glenn; RAND Corporation

Asymmetric Warfare Bibliography USAF Air University.

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Annual Report

China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army by James Mulvenon, David Finke

The papers in this volume offer a rich source of insight into the initial outlines of the PLA’s changing approaches to the conduct of operations. All of the authors used a body of professional materials published by the PLA in the original Chinese that represent some of the key writings to come out of this period of doctrinal reexamination. The papers likely represent the most current thinking on the PLA’s changing operational doctrine as can be found anywhere to this point in the English language. What is unique about this volume is that it focuses on PLA doctrine at the operational-level of warfare—the very level of conflict at which the PLA itself has put its own emphasis in its new doctrinal literature.

The Outsourcing of U.S. Intelligence Analysis: Will it Make Us More or Less Safe by Sebastian Abbot

This article was written as part of the Carnegie-Knight Initiative on the Future of Journalism Education, which is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. The Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism also provided valuable support.

Sebastian Abbot is a 2006 graduate of the Master in Public Policy program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and recently completed a summer journalism fellowship at Columbia University where he spent his time researching and writing about the private intelligence industry. Prior to attending the Kennedy School, he worked as a financial analyst in the investment banking and private equity industries with J.P. Morgan and Affiliated Managers Group. He has also worked as a freelance journalist in the Middle East and as a policy analyst with the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State. He received an A.B. in Economics from Princeton University in 1998.

CIRA and the Business of Revolutionizing Intelligence Analysis

Homeland Security: The Money Trail (Interactive flash presentation) The Department of Homeland Security receives roughly $40 billion each year to carry out its duties. This interactive presentation shows which companies have received the most money, what products have been purchased, which states have been awarded the largest anti-terror grants, who influences the decisions and which lobbyists are knocking on their doors.

HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment by COL Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army

The purpose of this article is to share insights and lessons learned from the reform of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division intelligence operations; specifically, lessons learned by conducting human intelligence (HUMINT)-centric operations in Iraq.

Training the Iraqi Army: an LNO shares his experiences with the 205th 'tigers'. Infantry Magazine

Maneuver Warfare Handbook by Bill Lind

Maneuver warfare, often controversial and requiring operational and tactical innovation, poses perhaps the most important doctrinal questions currently facing the conventional military forces of the U.S. Its purpose is to defeat the enemy by disrupting the opponent's ability to react, rather than by physical destruction of forces. This book develops and explains the theory of maneuver warfare and offers specific tactical, operational, and organizational recommendations for improving ground combat forces. The authors translate concepts-too often vaguely stated by manuever warfare advocates-into concrete doctrine. Although the book uses the Marine Corps as a model, the concepts, tactics, and doctrine discussed apply to any ground combat force.

Center of Gravity Analysis

Joint Operation Planning ( JP 5-0 ), clearly states the critical role of COG analysis: “The most important task confronting campaign planners in this process is being able to identify friendly and adversary strategic centers of gravity; that is, the sources of strength, power, and resistance.”

The reason identifying centers of gravity is the most important task is because a “faulty analysis of friendly or adversary centers of gravity can have very serious consequences; specifically, the inability to accomplish the military objectives at an acceptable cost and the unconscionable expenditure of lives, time, and materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive strategic or operational results.

Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: What Clausewitz (Really) meant by Center of Gravity by Dr. Joe Strange, USMC War College and Colonel Richard Iron, UK Army

Center of Gravity Analysis by Colonel Dale E. Eikmeier, U. S. Army
Center of Gravity and Asymmetric Conflict: Factoring in Culture. John W. Jandora, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 39, 4th Quarter, p. 78-83, 2005.
A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis by Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army

On War by Carl von Clausewitz

On War, unquestionably the most important single work ever written on the theory of warfare and of strategy, was written by the Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz is widely acknowledged as the most important of the major strategic theorists. Even though he's been dead for over a century and a half, he remains the most frequently cited, the most controversial, and in many respects the most modern.

The Command of the Air by Giulio Douhet

Published in 1921, Douhet states the cases forcefully for the employment of independent military air forces in war. He theorizes that aircraft should be used as offensive weapons to cripple an enemy air force on the ground and force capitulation through a sustained bombing campaign on the enemy’s homeland.