(U) Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Data Mining Report
This February 15, 2008 report covers the data mining activities of all elements of the ODNI.
Confronting context effects in Intelligence Analysis: How can Mathematics Help? by Keith Devlin
Abstract: We use the interpretation of a key piece of information in the 2002 U.S. decision to invade Iraq to motivate a study of the role of context in decision making. Although our primary focus is intelligence analysis, our study seeks to adopt a mathematical approach. This should make it applicable in a wide variety of application domains. In particular, the level of abstraction at which we work enables us to make useful comparisons between data gathering for intelligence analysis and Internet commerce, both of which depend on making crucial estimates of trust.
The initial examination of the way context influences reasoning and decision making, together with the results of studies carried out by others (some of which we mention), leads us to conclude that the role played by mathematics in improving intelligence analysis will necessarily be different from the role it plays in engineering or the natural sciences. Whereas some aspects of our study may find their way into the design of computer support tools for intelligence analysis — for instance the logical formalism we described in our earlier paper — we believe that the most significant benefits to intelligence analysis from this work are likely to be:
• better appreciation of the way context influences reasoning and decision making;
• sharper insight into the human problems inherent in intelligence analysis;
• improved analysis protocols to guide the intelligence analysis community.
In this respect, our study may be viewed as a mathematical analog of Richards J Heuer’s Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, a work on which we draw.
The initial examination of the way context influences reasoning and decision making, together with the results of studies carried out by others (some of which we mention), leads us to conclude that the role played by mathematics in improving intelligence analysis will necessarily be different from the role it plays in engineering or the natural sciences. Whereas some aspects of our study may find their way into the design of computer support tools for intelligence analysis — for instance the logical formalism we described in our earlier paper — we believe that the most significant benefits to intelligence analysis from this work are likely to be:
• better appreciation of the way context influences reasoning and decision making;
• sharper insight into the human problems inherent in intelligence analysis;
• improved analysis protocols to guide the intelligence analysis community.
In this respect, our study may be viewed as a mathematical analog of Richards J Heuer’s Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, a work on which we draw.
(U) CIA Strategic Roadmap: General Hayden, Director, CIA
Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. January 11, 2007
CIA Strategic Intent 2007-2011
CIA Strategic Intent 2007-2011
Can New Technology and Tradecraft Enhance Intelligence Sharing and National Security?
Council on Foreign Relations Video
Speakers: Calvin Andrus, Chief Technology Officer, Center for Mission Innovation, Central Intelligence Agency
Stephen DeAngelis, Founder, President and CEO, Enterra Solutions
Presider: Michael Moran, Executive Editor, Cfr.org
Speakers: Calvin Andrus, Chief Technology Officer, Center for Mission Innovation, Central Intelligence AgencyStephen DeAngelis, Founder, President and CEO, Enterra Solutions
Presider: Michael Moran, Executive Editor, Cfr.org
Global Stress Points Matrix™
The Global Stress Point Matrix™ provides a methodology for identifying and measuring events (stress points). It monitors the drivers and restrainers tending towards or against the event occurring.
Unlikely but foreseeable events can have important financial, strategic and political impacts on your organisation – particularly if you’re not prepared for them! Oxford Analytica has developed an Early Warning system to meet exactly these needs, which is called the Global Stress Point Matrix (GSPM)™.
The core of GSPM is a unique methodology that allows its users to be kept informed about political and economic surprises and threats, which although they may appear unlikely, would have severe consequences should they occur. It is a disciplined approach for ‘stepping outside conventional wisdom’, using Oxford Analytica’s global network of experts to ‘ask the right questions’.
The standard GSPM service currently monitors the 20 events that Oxford Analytica’s experts consider to be potentially the most disruptive to a broad range of clients. It estimates the impact of these events on:
- global GDP
- business operations
- geopolitics
- international financial markets.
Espionage in the United States since 2000
On January 29th , 2008, Congress heard testimony on enforcement of Federal espionage laws. Former FBI official David G. Major told a House Judiciary Committee panel that espionage remains "a very real threat to U.S. national security." He said, "Since the end of the Cold War, there have been 78 individuals arrested for espionage or espionage-related crimes and since the 21st century began, there have been 37 individuals arrested in the US as agents of foreign powers." In his testimony, Mr. Major, now President of the private Counterintelligence Centre, presented a convenient tabulation of "Agents of Foreign Powers Arrested in the United States in the 21st Century"
Recent espionage cases were also reviewed at the House Committee hearing by J. Patrick Rowan of the Department of Justice and Larry M. Wortzel of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Recent espionage cases were also reviewed at the House Committee hearing by J. Patrick Rowan of the Department of Justice and Larry M. Wortzel of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress
CRS Report for Congress
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to review this recommendation and present their advice by mid-February 2005, but ultimately, they did not recommend a transfer of paramilitary responsibilities. This Report will briefly describe special operations conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA and discuss the background of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. For additional information see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to review this recommendation and present their advice by mid-February 2005, but ultimately, they did not recommend a transfer of paramilitary responsibilities. This Report will briefly describe special operations conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA and discuss the background of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. For additional information see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?
CRS Report for Congress
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent the most formal assessment of a given issue by the U.S. Intelligence Community and address issues of major national security importance which may require congressional action. The intelligence process, however, is not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate. NIEs can provide insights into the likely effects of certain policy approaches, but they are not usually made to take into account the details of planned U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, or legislative initiatives.
In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on crucial security issues despite or perhaps because of the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364, section 1213) specifically requested a comprehensive NIE on Iran. In February 2007 the Intelligence Community also released an NIE on Prospects for Iraq’s Stability in response to a congressional request.
In early December 2007 the Director of National Intelligence released the Key Judgments of a National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The new NIE judged “with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.” Even though the NIE did recognize that “with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons,” this dramatic release of the Key Judgments on Iran heightened interest in the NIE process and its relevance to policymaking. Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which they are prepared or their inherent limitations.
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent the most formal assessment of a given issue by the U.S. Intelligence Community and address issues of major national security importance which may require congressional action. The intelligence process, however, is not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate. NIEs can provide insights into the likely effects of certain policy approaches, but they are not usually made to take into account the details of planned U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, or legislative initiatives.
In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on crucial security issues despite or perhaps because of the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364, section 1213) specifically requested a comprehensive NIE on Iran. In February 2007 the Intelligence Community also released an NIE on Prospects for Iraq’s Stability in response to a congressional request.
In early December 2007 the Director of National Intelligence released the Key Judgments of a National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The new NIE judged “with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.” Even though the NIE did recognize that “with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons,” this dramatic release of the Key Judgments on Iran heightened interest in the NIE process and its relevance to policymaking. Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which they are prepared or their inherent limitations.
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