Machines don't fight wars. Terrain doesn't fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the mind of humans. That's where the battles are won. - COL John R. Boyd
Digital Triage Forensics: Processing the Digital Crime Scene
The book is designed to be used in the training of our soldiers in battlefield collection principals worldwide. Digital Triage Forensics (DTF) is a procedural model for the investigation of Digital Crime Scenes including both Traditional Crime Scenes and the more complex Battlefield Crime Scenes. The United States Army and other traditional Police agencies use this model for current Digital Forensic Applications. The tool, training, and techniques from this practice are being brought to the public in this book for the first time. Now Corporations, Law Enforcement, and Consultants can benefit from the unique perspectives of the experts who coined "Digital Triage Forensics".
Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War
The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.
The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified.
In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.
In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.
The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified.
In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.
In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.
Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis
by the authors of Psychology of Intelligence Analysis and A Tradecraft Primer
Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis is a unique and far reaching compilation of 50 techniques that analysts can use to improve the rigor of their analysis. Use of the techniques almost always saves analysts time and facilitates collaboration, especially at the start of a project. The techniques are largely drawn from the intelligence world, but are also practical tools for analysts in a wide variety of professions such as law enforcement, medicine, finance, and business. In addition to defining the role and scope of Structured Analysis as a distinct form of analysis, the book systematically walks readers through a taxonomy of eight distinct categories of techniques that shape a robust analytic process. Each of the 50 techniques includes step-by-step instructions, a description of both when to use the technique and the value it adds to analysis, and potential pitfalls to be avoided when using it. Examples of the technique and an explanation of how it relates to others in the book are also included in many of the descriptions. The authors augment this extensive set of techniques with chapters on effective analytic collaboration, how to validate the effectiveness of Structured Analytic Techniques, and a vision for how to achieve a more robust analytic climate in the future. By defining the domain of structured analytic techniques, providing a manual for teaching these techniques, and outlining the research that needs to be done on these techniques, the book lays a common ground that will enable analysts to work even more effectively and efficiently.
Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis is a unique and far reaching compilation of 50 techniques that analysts can use to improve the rigor of their analysis. Use of the techniques almost always saves analysts time and facilitates collaboration, especially at the start of a project. The techniques are largely drawn from the intelligence world, but are also practical tools for analysts in a wide variety of professions such as law enforcement, medicine, finance, and business. In addition to defining the role and scope of Structured Analysis as a distinct form of analysis, the book systematically walks readers through a taxonomy of eight distinct categories of techniques that shape a robust analytic process. Each of the 50 techniques includes step-by-step instructions, a description of both when to use the technique and the value it adds to analysis, and potential pitfalls to be avoided when using it. Examples of the technique and an explanation of how it relates to others in the book are also included in many of the descriptions. The authors augment this extensive set of techniques with chapters on effective analytic collaboration, how to validate the effectiveness of Structured Analytic Techniques, and a vision for how to achieve a more robust analytic climate in the future. By defining the domain of structured analytic techniques, providing a manual for teaching these techniques, and outlining the research that needs to be done on these techniques, the book lays a common ground that will enable analysts to work even more effectively and efficiently.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)