Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. January 11, 2007
CIA Strategic Intent 2007-2011
Can New Technology and Tradecraft Enhance Intelligence Sharing and National Security?
Council on Foreign Relations Video
Speakers: Calvin Andrus, Chief Technology Officer, Center for Mission Innovation, Central Intelligence Agency
Stephen DeAngelis, Founder, President and CEO, Enterra Solutions
Presider: Michael Moran, Executive Editor, Cfr.org
Speakers: Calvin Andrus, Chief Technology Officer, Center for Mission Innovation, Central Intelligence AgencyStephen DeAngelis, Founder, President and CEO, Enterra Solutions
Presider: Michael Moran, Executive Editor, Cfr.org
Global Stress Points Matrix™
The Global Stress Point Matrix™ provides a methodology for identifying and measuring events (stress points). It monitors the drivers and restrainers tending towards or against the event occurring.
Unlikely but foreseeable events can have important financial, strategic and political impacts on your organisation – particularly if you’re not prepared for them! Oxford Analytica has developed an Early Warning system to meet exactly these needs, which is called the Global Stress Point Matrix (GSPM)™.
The core of GSPM is a unique methodology that allows its users to be kept informed about political and economic surprises and threats, which although they may appear unlikely, would have severe consequences should they occur. It is a disciplined approach for ‘stepping outside conventional wisdom’, using Oxford Analytica’s global network of experts to ‘ask the right questions’.
The standard GSPM service currently monitors the 20 events that Oxford Analytica’s experts consider to be potentially the most disruptive to a broad range of clients. It estimates the impact of these events on:
- global GDP
- business operations
- geopolitics
- international financial markets.
Espionage in the United States since 2000
On January 29th , 2008, Congress heard testimony on enforcement of Federal espionage laws. Former FBI official David G. Major told a House Judiciary Committee panel that espionage remains "a very real threat to U.S. national security." He said, "Since the end of the Cold War, there have been 78 individuals arrested for espionage or espionage-related crimes and since the 21st century began, there have been 37 individuals arrested in the US as agents of foreign powers." In his testimony, Mr. Major, now President of the private Counterintelligence Centre, presented a convenient tabulation of "Agents of Foreign Powers Arrested in the United States in the 21st Century"
Recent espionage cases were also reviewed at the House Committee hearing by J. Patrick Rowan of the Department of Justice and Larry M. Wortzel of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Recent espionage cases were also reviewed at the House Committee hearing by J. Patrick Rowan of the Department of Justice and Larry M. Wortzel of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress
CRS Report for Congress
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to review this recommendation and present their advice by mid-February 2005, but ultimately, they did not recommend a transfer of paramilitary responsibilities. This Report will briefly describe special operations conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA and discuss the background of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. For additional information see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to review this recommendation and present their advice by mid-February 2005, but ultimately, they did not recommend a transfer of paramilitary responsibilities. This Report will briefly describe special operations conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA and discuss the background of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. For additional information see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?
CRS Report for Congress
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent the most formal assessment of a given issue by the U.S. Intelligence Community and address issues of major national security importance which may require congressional action. The intelligence process, however, is not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate. NIEs can provide insights into the likely effects of certain policy approaches, but they are not usually made to take into account the details of planned U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, or legislative initiatives.
In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on crucial security issues despite or perhaps because of the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364, section 1213) specifically requested a comprehensive NIE on Iran. In February 2007 the Intelligence Community also released an NIE on Prospects for Iraq’s Stability in response to a congressional request.
In early December 2007 the Director of National Intelligence released the Key Judgments of a National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The new NIE judged “with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.” Even though the NIE did recognize that “with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons,” this dramatic release of the Key Judgments on Iran heightened interest in the NIE process and its relevance to policymaking. Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which they are prepared or their inherent limitations.
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent the most formal assessment of a given issue by the U.S. Intelligence Community and address issues of major national security importance which may require congressional action. The intelligence process, however, is not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate. NIEs can provide insights into the likely effects of certain policy approaches, but they are not usually made to take into account the details of planned U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, or legislative initiatives.
In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on crucial security issues despite or perhaps because of the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364, section 1213) specifically requested a comprehensive NIE on Iran. In February 2007 the Intelligence Community also released an NIE on Prospects for Iraq’s Stability in response to a congressional request.
In early December 2007 the Director of National Intelligence released the Key Judgments of a National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The new NIE judged “with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.” Even though the NIE did recognize that “with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons,” this dramatic release of the Key Judgments on Iran heightened interest in the NIE process and its relevance to policymaking. Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which they are prepared or their inherent limitations.
The Arab Mind by Raphael Patai
The Arab Mind by Raphael Patai. Book Review by Lloyd F. JordanRaphael Patai's The Arab Mind, is a significant scholarly contribution to the field of national character research in general and, more specifically, to the understanding of Arab culture and national character. Further, the book implicitly suggests the relevance of national character research to intelligence analysis.
What, if any, utility does the field of national character research have for intelligence? It appears that the intelligence officer often implicitly incorporates into intelligence assessments certain national character considerations in an unsystematic and, perhaps, unconscious way. The question is whether or not the collection, organization, and systematic analysis of the types of data that are used in national character studies within a more structured analytical framework would make a significant contribution to a number of fields of intelligence activity.
Despite the relatively primitive level of methodological and conceptual rigor that obtain in the national character research field, it has utility now and considerable potential for intelligence analysis in the future. National character analyses can provide a useful, albeit broad, gauge against which the behavior of elites, governments, and electorates can be assessed in particular situations. Once a national character construct, such as that of the Arabs, has been developed, the next and most difficult task is to attempt to establish linkages between it and a propensity for action. An important intermediate step in this process for intelligence purposes is to focus upon the extent and ways in which elites or other subgroups of a given society vary from the modal personality or national character.
In summation, the work of Patai and others in the national character research field merits serious examination for the contribution it can make to intelligence analysis and possibly other areas of intelligence activity.
The Human Terrain System (HTS)
Many of the principal challenges we face in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF) stem from initial institutional disregard for the necessity to understand the people among whom our forces operate as well as the cultural characteristics and propensities of the enemies we now fight. To help address these shortcomings in cultural knowledge and capabilities, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine command (TRADOC) organization that supports the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is overseeing the creation of the human terrain system (HTS).
This system is being specifically designed to address cultural awareness shortcomings at the operational and tactical levels by giving brigade commanders an organic capability to help understand and deal with "human terrain"-the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating. So that U.S. forces can operate more effectively in the human terrain in which insurgents live and function, HTS will provide deployed brigade commanders and their staffs direct social-science support in the form of ethnographic and social research, cultural information research, and social data analysis that can be employed as part of the military decisionmaking process.
Human Terrain System (U.S. Army website)
Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship by Montgomery McFate
Networds: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnographic Intelligence by LTC Fred Renzi
This system is being specifically designed to address cultural awareness shortcomings at the operational and tactical levels by giving brigade commanders an organic capability to help understand and deal with "human terrain"-the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating. So that U.S. forces can operate more effectively in the human terrain in which insurgents live and function, HTS will provide deployed brigade commanders and their staffs direct social-science support in the form of ethnographic and social research, cultural information research, and social data analysis that can be employed as part of the military decisionmaking process.
Human Terrain System (U.S. Army website)
Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship by Montgomery McFate
Networds: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnographic Intelligence by LTC Fred Renzi
Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior
RAND monograph by John Hollywood, Diane Snyder, Kenneth McKay, John Boon
This monograph presents a unique approach to “connecting the dots” in intelligence—selecting and assembling disparate pieces of information to produce a general understanding of a threat. Modeled after key thought processes used by successful and proactive problem solvers to identify potential threats, the schema described in this document identifies out-of-the-ordinary, atypical behavior that is potentially related to terror activity; seeks to understand the behavior by putting it into context; generates and tests hypotheses about what the atypical behavior might mean; and prioritizes the results, focusing analysts’ attention on the most significant atypical findings. In addition to discussing the schema, this document describes a supporting conceptual architecture that dynamically tailors the analysis in response to discoveries about the observed behavior and presents specific techniques for identifying and analyzing out-of-the-ordinary information.
This monograph presents a unique approach to “connecting the dots” in intelligence—selecting and assembling disparate pieces of information to produce a general understanding of a threat. Modeled after key thought processes used by successful and proactive problem solvers to identify potential threats, the schema described in this document identifies out-of-the-ordinary, atypical behavior that is potentially related to terror activity; seeks to understand the behavior by putting it into context; generates and tests hypotheses about what the atypical behavior might mean; and prioritizes the results, focusing analysts’ attention on the most significant atypical findings. In addition to discussing the schema, this document describes a supporting conceptual architecture that dynamically tailors the analysis in response to discoveries about the observed behavior and presents specific techniques for identifying and analyzing out-of-the-ordinary information.
Deception Detection by Analysis of Competing Hypotheses
MITRE Sponsored Research by Frank Stech & Chris Elsaesser.
Abstract: We outline a business process to assist intelligence analysts detect deception. We describe how deceptions exploit cognitive limits and biases and review prior work on processes that can help people recognize organized deceptions. Our process is based on Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, which we automate by generating state-based plans and converting them to Bayesian belief networks. Our process uses a concept from Bayesian classification to identify distinguishing evidence that a deceiver must hide and a counter-deceiver must uncover. White paper
Fooled Again? Developing Counter-deception Decision Support
Abstract: We outline a business process to assist intelligence analysts detect deception. We describe how deceptions exploit cognitive limits and biases and review prior work on processes that can help people recognize organized deceptions. Our process is based on Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, which we automate by generating state-based plans and converting them to Bayesian belief networks. Our process uses a concept from Bayesian classification to identify distinguishing evidence that a deceiver must hide and a counter-deceiver must uncover. White paper
Fooled Again? Developing Counter-deception Decision Support
In-Q-Tel: A New Partnership Between the CIA and the Private Sector
In-Q-Tel identifies and partners with companies developing cutting-edge technologies to help deliver these solutions to the Central Intelligence Agency and the broader U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to further their missions.
Launched by the CIA in 1999 as a private, independent, not-for-profit organization, IQT was created to bridge the gap between the technology needs of the Intelligence Community and new advances in commercial technology. With limited insight into fast-moving private sector innovation, the IC needed a way to find emerging companies, and, more importantly, to work with them. IQT, as a private company with deep ties to the commercial world, is able to attract and build relationships with technology entrepreneurs outside the reach of the IC. In fact, more than 75 percent of the companies that IQT works with had never done business with the government before partnering with IQT.
Case Study: In-Q-Tel by Josh Lerner, Felda Hardymon, Kevin Book, Ann Leamon February 12, 2004 Source—Harvard Business School
Accelerating the Acquisition and Implementation of New Technologies for Intelligence: The Report of the Independent Panel on the CIA In-Q-Tel Venture June 2001 Source—Business Executives for National Security
Launched by the CIA in 1999 as a private, independent, not-for-profit organization, IQT was created to bridge the gap between the technology needs of the Intelligence Community and new advances in commercial technology. With limited insight into fast-moving private sector innovation, the IC needed a way to find emerging companies, and, more importantly, to work with them. IQT, as a private company with deep ties to the commercial world, is able to attract and build relationships with technology entrepreneurs outside the reach of the IC. In fact, more than 75 percent of the companies that IQT works with had never done business with the government before partnering with IQT.
Case Study: In-Q-Tel by Josh Lerner, Felda Hardymon, Kevin Book, Ann Leamon February 12, 2004 Source—Harvard Business School
Accelerating the Acquisition and Implementation of New Technologies for Intelligence: The Report of the Independent Panel on the CIA In-Q-Tel Venture June 2001 Source—Business Executives for National Security
Culture: The New Key Terrain, Integrating Cultural Competence into Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace by Major O. Kent Strader
This monograph suggests that it maybe possible to weaponize culture, specifically through the use of cultural intelligence. In order to weaponize culture, commanders and staffs must develop competence culturally to leverage the key relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities. Competence is "the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence that allows focused insight into current operations." Finally, the purpose of this monograph is to convince operational leaders that a systems approach to culture is the best method of deduction to achieve cultural competence.
The framework this monograph employees includes international relations, history, theory and an analysis of current doctrine. After establishing why culture has become they new key terrain this monograph suggests modification to the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process and ways to incorporate cultural competence into campaign design using a systems approach to culture.
Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
The framework this monograph employees includes international relations, history, theory and an analysis of current doctrine. After establishing why culture has become they new key terrain this monograph suggests modification to the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process and ways to incorporate cultural competence into campaign design using a systems approach to culture.
Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study by Dr. Rob Johnston
An effort to assess intelligence analysis from an anthropological viewpoint. Identifies and describes conditions and variables that negatively affect intelligence analysis. Investigates analytic culture, methodology, error, and failure within the Intelligence Community. Uses an applied anthropological methodology that includes interviews, direct and participant observation, and focus groups.
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