Body of Secrets by James Bamford
Chatter (Video) by Robert Baer
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for Counterterrorism by Troy S. Thomas
(U) FM 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
(U) FM 2-01.301 Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis by Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army
The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities by Dr. Joe Strange, USMC War College and Colonel Richard Iron, UK Army
"To Our Great Detriment": Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad by
Major Stephen Coughlin, Military Intelligence, USAR
(U) FM 2-01.301 Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis by Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army
The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities by Dr. Joe Strange, USMC War College and Colonel Richard Iron, UK Army
"To Our Great Detriment": Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad by
Major Stephen Coughlin, Military Intelligence, USAR
Teaching Intelligence Analysts in the UK
What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies Program by Michael S. Goodman and Sir David Omand Unclassified extracts from CIA Studies in Intelligence Volume 52, Number 4
Bring Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices
Learning with Professionals: Selected Works from the Joint Military Intelligence College
A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies
Experiences to Go: Teaching with Intelligence Case Studies
Shakespeare for Analysts: Literature and Intelligence
Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas
Intelligence Essentials for Everyone by Lisa Krizan
Bring Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices
Learning with Professionals: Selected Works from the Joint Military Intelligence College
A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies
Experiences to Go: Teaching with Intelligence Case Studies
Shakespeare for Analysts: Literature and Intelligence
Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas
Intelligence Essentials for Everyone by Lisa Krizan
A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis.
CIA Publications
The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers
Volume 1:
No. 1: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning
No. 2: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process
No. 3: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities
No. 4: When everything is intelligence - nothing is intelligence
No. 5: Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis
Volume 2:
No. 1: Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?
No. 2: Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence
No. 3: Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations
Volume 3:
No. 1: Making Sense of Transnational Threats
No. 2: Rethinking “Alternative Analysis” to Address Transnational Threats
A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes by Jack Davis
Estimates and Influence by Sherman Kent
The State of Strategic Intelligence by John G. Heidenrich
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards J, Heuer, Jr.
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis by David T. Moore, DIA Occassional Paper No. 14
Anticipating Suprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning by Cynthia M. Grabo
Warning Analysis for the Information Age by John W. Bodnar
The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers
Volume 1:
No. 1: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning
No. 2: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process
No. 3: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities
No. 4: When everything is intelligence - nothing is intelligence
No. 5: Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis
Volume 2:
No. 1: Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?
No. 2: Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence
No. 3: Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations
Volume 3:
No. 1: Making Sense of Transnational Threats
No. 2: Rethinking “Alternative Analysis” to Address Transnational Threats
A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes by Jack Davis
Estimates and Influence by Sherman Kent
The State of Strategic Intelligence by John G. Heidenrich
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards J, Heuer, Jr.
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis by David T. Moore, DIA Occassional Paper No. 14
Anticipating Suprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning by Cynthia M. Grabo
Warning Analysis for the Information Age by John W. Bodnar
Cells Wars: The Changing Landscape of Communications Intelligence
Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS). Research Paper No. 131 May 2009 by Joseph Fitsanakis and Ian Allen.
The 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict featured a series of innovative approaches to communications intelligence, which included utilizing civilian telephone networks to achieve tactical and psychological objectives. The "cell war" between the IDF and Hamas is indicative of an ongoing global struggle between asymmetrical insurgents and state actors to control large-scale telecommunications structures. "Cell wars" have been taking place for quite some time in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, and several other nations, including inside the United States. Weapons in this hi-tech conflict include surveillance satellites, voice scramblers, encryption software and mobile phone cameras, among other technologies. Essentially, this war is being fought over the control over national and international telecommunications grids, and centers increasingly on telecommunications service providers —companies such as Jawwal in Palestine, Roshan in Afghanistan, or Mobilink in Pakistan. These companies are rapidly becoming combat zones in a battle to control the channels of digital communications in 21st-century asymmetrical warfare.
The 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict featured a series of innovative approaches to communications intelligence, which included utilizing civilian telephone networks to achieve tactical and psychological objectives. The "cell war" between the IDF and Hamas is indicative of an ongoing global struggle between asymmetrical insurgents and state actors to control large-scale telecommunications structures. "Cell wars" have been taking place for quite some time in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, and several other nations, including inside the United States. Weapons in this hi-tech conflict include surveillance satellites, voice scramblers, encryption software and mobile phone cameras, among other technologies. Essentially, this war is being fought over the control over national and international telecommunications grids, and centers increasingly on telecommunications service providers —companies such as Jawwal in Palestine, Roshan in Afghanistan, or Mobilink in Pakistan. These companies are rapidly becoming combat zones in a battle to control the channels of digital communications in 21st-century asymmetrical warfare.
Security Before Politics
by Porter Goss, Director of the CIA from September 2004 to May 2006 and Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from 1997 to 2004.
"Since leaving my post as CIA director almost three years ago, I have remained largely silent on the public stage. I am speaking out now because I feel our government has crossed the red line between properly protecting our national security and trying to gain partisan political advantage."
"Since leaving my post as CIA director almost three years ago, I have remained largely silent on the public stage. I am speaking out now because I feel our government has crossed the red line between properly protecting our national security and trying to gain partisan political advantage."
The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
Four hundred years ago, Francis Bacon warned that our minds are wired to deceive us. "Beware the fallacies into which undisciplined thinkers most easily fall--they are the real distorting prisms of human nature." Chief among them: "Assuming more order than exists in chaotic nature." Now consider the typical stock market report: "Today investors bid shares down out of concern over Iranian oil production." Sigh. We're still doing it.Our brains are wired for narrative, not statistical uncertainty. And so we tell ourselves simple stories to explain complex thing we don't--and, most importantly, can't--know. The truth is that we have no idea why stock markets go up or down on any given day, and whatever reason we give is sure to be grossly simplified, if not flat out wrong.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb first made this argument in Fooled by Randomness, an engaging look at the history and reasons for our predilection for self-deception when it comes to statistics. Now, in The Black Swan: the Impact of the Highly Improbable, he focuses on that most dismal of sciences, predicting the future. Forecasting is not just at the heart of Wall Street, but it’s something each of us does every time we make an insurance payment or strap on a seat belt.
The problem, Nassim explains, is that we place too much weight on the odds that past events will repeat (diligently trying to follow the path of the "millionaire next door," when unrepeatable chance is a better explanation). Instead, the really important events are rare and unpredictable. He calls them Black Swans, which is a reference to a 17th century philosophical thought experiment. In Europe all anyone had ever seen were white swans; indeed, "all swans are white" had long been used as the standard example of a scientific truth. So what was the chance of seeing a black one? Impossible to calculate, or at least they were until 1697, when explorers found Cygnus atratus in Australia.
Nassim argues that most of the really big events in our world are rare and unpredictable, and thus trying to extract generalizable stories to explain them may be emotionally satisfying, but it's practically useless. September 11th is one such example, and stock market crashes are another. Or, as he puts it, "History does not crawl, it jumps." Our assumptions grow out of the bell-curve predictability of what he calls "Mediocristan," while our world is really shaped by the wild powerlaw swings of "Extremistan."
In full disclosure, I'm a long admirer of Taleb's work and a few of my comments on drafts found their way into the book. I, too, look at the world through the powerlaw lens, and I too find that it reveals how many of our assumptions are wrong. But Taleb takes this to a new level with a delightful romp through history, economics, and the frailties of human nature. --Chris Anderson editor-in-chief of Wired magazine
Logical Fallacies and the Art of Debate
Torture Documents Released Under Freedom of Information Act
Senate Floor Statement on the Report of the Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into the Treatment Of Detainees In U.S. Custody, November 20, 2008 (Released April, 22 2009)
Other documents released under FOIA
Department of Defense Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information: This compilation of 10 articles on interrogation methods and their efficacy comprises the first phase of a larger project sponsored by the Intelligence Science Board, which was chartered in 2002 to advise senior intelligence officials on scientific and technical issues of importance to the Intelligence Community.
Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War by Albert D. Biderman. Presented at a combined meeting of the Section on Neurology and Psychiatry with the New York Neurological Society at The New York Academy of Medicine, November 13, 1956, as part of a Panel Discussion on Communist Methods of Interrogation and Indoctrination. This report is based on work done under ARDC Project No. 7733, Task 77314, in support of the research and development program of the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center. Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into the Treatment Of Detainees In U.S. Custody, November 20, 2008 (Released April, 22 2009)
Other documents released under FOIA
Department of Defense Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information: This compilation of 10 articles on interrogation methods and their efficacy comprises the first phase of a larger project sponsored by the Intelligence Science Board, which was chartered in 2002 to advise senior intelligence officials on scientific and technical issues of importance to the Intelligence Community.
Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War by Albert D. Biderman. Presented at a combined meeting of the Section on Neurology and Psychiatry with the New York Neurological Society at The New York Academy of Medicine, November 13, 1956, as part of a Panel Discussion on Communist Methods of Interrogation and Indoctrination. This report is based on work done under ARDC Project No. 7733, Task 77314, in support of the research and development program of the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center. Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.
The Man in the Snow White Cell: Limits to Interrogation
by Merle L. Pribbenow, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence.
The Role of Targeted Killing
by Colonel Peter M. Cullen. Published in Joint Forces Quarterly, Isssue 48.
Targeted killing is “the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit government approval.” In recent years, targeted killing as a tactic in the ongoing campaign against terrorism has generated considerable controversy. Some commentators view it as an indispensable tool and argue for its expanded use, while others question its legality and claim that it is immoral and ultimately ineffective.
While the United States has not explicitly acknowledged pursuing a policy of targeted killing, insights can be gleaned from published national security documents and official statements that shed light on U.S. willingness to employ targeted killing as a tactic in the campaign against terror. Since September 11, 2001, however, the United States has consistently conducted targeted killing operations against terrorist personnel. This article examines the legality, morality, and potential efficacy of a U.S. policy of targeted killing in its campaign against transnational terror. The conclusion is that, in spite of the genuine controversy surrounding this subject, a carefully circumscribed policy of targeted killing can be a legal, moral, and effective tool in a counterterror proper implementation of a U.S. policy of targeted killing are proposed.
Targeted killing is “the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit government approval.” In recent years, targeted killing as a tactic in the ongoing campaign against terrorism has generated considerable controversy. Some commentators view it as an indispensable tool and argue for its expanded use, while others question its legality and claim that it is immoral and ultimately ineffective.
While the United States has not explicitly acknowledged pursuing a policy of targeted killing, insights can be gleaned from published national security documents and official statements that shed light on U.S. willingness to employ targeted killing as a tactic in the campaign against terror. Since September 11, 2001, however, the United States has consistently conducted targeted killing operations against terrorist personnel. This article examines the legality, morality, and potential efficacy of a U.S. policy of targeted killing in its campaign against transnational terror. The conclusion is that, in spite of the genuine controversy surrounding this subject, a carefully circumscribed policy of targeted killing can be a legal, moral, and effective tool in a counterterror proper implementation of a U.S. policy of targeted killing are proposed.
Rendition: The Beast and the Man
by Colonel Kevin M. Cieply. Published in Joint Forces Quarterly, Isssue 48.
"Excessive secrecy, duplicity and clandestine skullduggery are simply not our dish—not only because we are incapable of keeping a secret anyway (our commercial media of communication see to that), but, more importantly, because such operations conflict with our own traditional standards and compromise our diplomacy in other areas. . . . One may say that to deny ourselves this species of capability is to accept a serious limitation on our ability to contend with forces now directed against us. Perhaps; but if so, it is a limitation with which we shall have to live." - George F. Keenan
Trial of CIA, Italian agents provides rare look at intelligence work - LA Times
"Excessive secrecy, duplicity and clandestine skullduggery are simply not our dish—not only because we are incapable of keeping a secret anyway (our commercial media of communication see to that), but, more importantly, because such operations conflict with our own traditional standards and compromise our diplomacy in other areas. . . . One may say that to deny ourselves this species of capability is to accept a serious limitation on our ability to contend with forces now directed against us. Perhaps; but if so, it is a limitation with which we shall have to live." - George F. Keenan
Trial of CIA, Italian agents provides rare look at intelligence work - LA Times
Disrupting Threat Finances: Using Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations
by Wesley J.L. Anderson, Joint Special Operations University 08-3
Terrorist financing is a critical issue in the current fight against transnational terrorist networks or groups.
Major Anderson provides an excellent overview of terrorist financing and expands upon how it fits into the broader construct of threat financing. He articulates the significant challenges any government faces in trying to interrupt the terrorist networks use of the global financial system. The sheer immensity of this system provides ample opportunity for terrorists to operate undetected or unhindered. He also highlights that the very international nature of the global economic system presents enormous challenges in trying to coordinate amongst the almost 200 sovereign states that comprise the current world order.
INTERPOL Links:
Funds derived from criminal activities
Alternative remittance systems distinguishing sub-systems of ethnic money laundering in INTERPOL member countries on the Asian continent
The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering
Terrorist financing is a critical issue in the current fight against transnational terrorist networks or groups.
Major Anderson provides an excellent overview of terrorist financing and expands upon how it fits into the broader construct of threat financing. He articulates the significant challenges any government faces in trying to interrupt the terrorist networks use of the global financial system. The sheer immensity of this system provides ample opportunity for terrorists to operate undetected or unhindered. He also highlights that the very international nature of the global economic system presents enormous challenges in trying to coordinate amongst the almost 200 sovereign states that comprise the current world order.
INTERPOL Links:
Funds derived from criminal activities
Alternative remittance systems distinguishing sub-systems of ethnic money laundering in INTERPOL member countries on the Asian continent
The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering
Does President Obama Need a Better CIA Spy Network?
by Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
The U.S. devotes about $50 billion yearly to efforts to assess the capabilities and intentions of other nations. Most of it buys satellite imagery and technology to intercept and decode communications. A big chunk goes to the military for its operational needs, a smaller part to the CIA for analyses and on-the-ground espionage.
President Obama will be looking to find out the answers to big questions such as these: Where is Osama bin Laden? Are Iranian and North Korean leaders determined to pursue nuclear-weapons programs? Will Iraqi leaders be able to govern together in peace? Can the political future of Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai be salvaged?
Over the years, U.S. intelligence has delivered good value on matters such as whether Russia would raise oil prices or on the size of China's military. But on many vital questions, the payoffs were dismal: whether the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 could rally Cubans against Castro and the danger of the Shah of Iran's being overthrown in 1979.
Every President has tried to correct deficiencies. They've hired and fired CIA chiefs. Or they've circumvented the system by getting information directly from their foreign counterparts. Since they've spent their lives sizing up people, many Presidents figure they can do that better than the CIA. They're almost always wrong. Bill Clinton thought he had such a fix on Yasir Arafat that he gambled U.S. prestige on the Palestinian's agreeing to a peace accord with Israel in 2000; Arafat refused to sign. George W. Bush met with Russia's Vladimir Putin in 2001 and said, "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy...I was able to get a sense of his soul."
It seems Bush missed a thing or two in his peek into Putin's soul. President Kennedy used another technique. In 1963, he sent two experts with very different backgrounds to Vietnam to tell him what was happening. Maj. Gen. Victor "Brute" Krulak and career diplomat Joseph Mendenhall came back with such wildly divergent accounts that Kennedy quipped, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?" The dirty little secret is that it's difficult to deliver the information Presidents want. Why?
First, it is hard to predict political events. Why should intelligence agencies be able to forecast the future abroad when we can't do it here? In addition, great upheavals - like the collapse of the Soviet Union - generally don't announce themselves. They erupt from long-suppressed hatred that transcends the fear of police or military reprisals.
Second, adversaries will zealously guard their positions on critical issues. Experts probably will never stop debating whether North Korea is ready to cash in its nuclear weapons in exchange for bribes. What's going on in foreign leaders' heads is often revealed only after Presidents act and make proposals, which spark reactions and unearth underlying aims. Similarly, adversaries do well at concealing their most important secrets, especially those related to sensitive weapons. In the Cold War, we ringed the Soviet Union with listening posts and satellites and still couldn't track many of its programs. In 1998, we were clueless about India's plans to explode a nuclear device, despite heavy surveillance. Nor did Washington ever have a real fix on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, pressure on intelligence experts to conform their estimates to Presidential policies is inescapable, and it distorts evaluations. Once the President takes a clear stance, the intelligence community rarely contradicts him - except with anonymous leaks. Intelligence is a major battlefield on which policy battles are fought. Knowledge is power, and every player in Washington fights to define reality for the President. When hawks convinced U.S. leaders that Moscow had military superiority, they won the ability to spend more on defense and to resist negotiating. If hard-liners persuade Obama today that Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is hell-bent on destroying Israel and the U.S., they'll win the debate on taking action to overthrow him.
Every country - not just the U.S. - has problems obtaining good intelligence. Even with the best espionage and analysts, they can't escape the distortions of their culture and politics. Presidents can also take consolation in the fact that as important as good intelligence is to successful policy, there are more important factors. The Soviets had all the intelligence their hearts desired during the Cold War with double agents like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen. These U.S. spies knew our secrets and helped keep Moscow in the power competition against America. We had no comparable agents. Still, the Soviets lost the Cold War hands down. They had better intelligence, but we had a much better country. [Gelb/Parade/8March2009]
The U.S. devotes about $50 billion yearly to efforts to assess the capabilities and intentions of other nations. Most of it buys satellite imagery and technology to intercept and decode communications. A big chunk goes to the military for its operational needs, a smaller part to the CIA for analyses and on-the-ground espionage.
President Obama will be looking to find out the answers to big questions such as these: Where is Osama bin Laden? Are Iranian and North Korean leaders determined to pursue nuclear-weapons programs? Will Iraqi leaders be able to govern together in peace? Can the political future of Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai be salvaged?
Over the years, U.S. intelligence has delivered good value on matters such as whether Russia would raise oil prices or on the size of China's military. But on many vital questions, the payoffs were dismal: whether the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 could rally Cubans against Castro and the danger of the Shah of Iran's being overthrown in 1979.
Every President has tried to correct deficiencies. They've hired and fired CIA chiefs. Or they've circumvented the system by getting information directly from their foreign counterparts. Since they've spent their lives sizing up people, many Presidents figure they can do that better than the CIA. They're almost always wrong. Bill Clinton thought he had such a fix on Yasir Arafat that he gambled U.S. prestige on the Palestinian's agreeing to a peace accord with Israel in 2000; Arafat refused to sign. George W. Bush met with Russia's Vladimir Putin in 2001 and said, "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy...I was able to get a sense of his soul."
It seems Bush missed a thing or two in his peek into Putin's soul. President Kennedy used another technique. In 1963, he sent two experts with very different backgrounds to Vietnam to tell him what was happening. Maj. Gen. Victor "Brute" Krulak and career diplomat Joseph Mendenhall came back with such wildly divergent accounts that Kennedy quipped, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?" The dirty little secret is that it's difficult to deliver the information Presidents want. Why?
First, it is hard to predict political events. Why should intelligence agencies be able to forecast the future abroad when we can't do it here? In addition, great upheavals - like the collapse of the Soviet Union - generally don't announce themselves. They erupt from long-suppressed hatred that transcends the fear of police or military reprisals.
Second, adversaries will zealously guard their positions on critical issues. Experts probably will never stop debating whether North Korea is ready to cash in its nuclear weapons in exchange for bribes. What's going on in foreign leaders' heads is often revealed only after Presidents act and make proposals, which spark reactions and unearth underlying aims. Similarly, adversaries do well at concealing their most important secrets, especially those related to sensitive weapons. In the Cold War, we ringed the Soviet Union with listening posts and satellites and still couldn't track many of its programs. In 1998, we were clueless about India's plans to explode a nuclear device, despite heavy surveillance. Nor did Washington ever have a real fix on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, pressure on intelligence experts to conform their estimates to Presidential policies is inescapable, and it distorts evaluations. Once the President takes a clear stance, the intelligence community rarely contradicts him - except with anonymous leaks. Intelligence is a major battlefield on which policy battles are fought. Knowledge is power, and every player in Washington fights to define reality for the President. When hawks convinced U.S. leaders that Moscow had military superiority, they won the ability to spend more on defense and to resist negotiating. If hard-liners persuade Obama today that Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is hell-bent on destroying Israel and the U.S., they'll win the debate on taking action to overthrow him.
Every country - not just the U.S. - has problems obtaining good intelligence. Even with the best espionage and analysts, they can't escape the distortions of their culture and politics. Presidents can also take consolation in the fact that as important as good intelligence is to successful policy, there are more important factors. The Soviets had all the intelligence their hearts desired during the Cold War with double agents like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen. These U.S. spies knew our secrets and helped keep Moscow in the power competition against America. We had no comparable agents. Still, the Soviets lost the Cold War hands down. They had better intelligence, but we had a much better country. [Gelb/Parade/8March2009]
Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. February 25, 2009
Hearing of the House Permanent Select COmmittee on Intelligence. February 25, 2009
Hearing of the House Permanent Select COmmittee on Intelligence. February 25, 2009
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