Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. Beyond the experience in these two countries, it is likely that U.S. forces will face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies that are unwilling to engage in conventional combat with U.S. forces. This suggests the need for a well-structured systems analysis process to address the insurgent threat as it is evolving in Iraq and Afghanistan and to assist in the development of more-general approaches to such
threats in future campaigns.
This monograph presents a broad range of analytic techniques that can be used to support the security portion of counterinsurgency operations. Its purpose is not to discuss the broader elements of counterinsurgency, such as nation-building and improvements to governance in nations threatened with insurgency. Instead, it combines research supporting two complementary studies: one focused on ways to improve U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities and a second aimed at developing
operational analysis techniques to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The first study provides a framework for thinking about the nature of an insurgency and the latter then examines operational analysis techniques to answer the operational and tactical counterinsurgency questions that evolve at each stage in the insurgency.