Destabilizing Networks

Authors: Kathleen M.Carley, Ju Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt

The world we live in is a complex socio-technical system. Although social, organizational, and policy analysts have long recognized that groups, organizations, institutions, and the societies they are embedded are complex systems; it is only recently that we have had the tools for systematically thinking about, representing, modelling and analyzing these systems. These tools include multi-agent computer models and the body of statistical tools and measures in social networks.

This paper uses social network analysis and multi-agent models to discuss how to destabilize networks. In addition, we illustrate the potential difficulty in destabilizing networks that are at large, distributed, and composed of individuals linked on a number of socio-demographic dimensions. The specific results herein are generated, and our ability to think through such systems in enhanced, by using a multi-agent network approach to complex systems. Such an illustration is particularly salient in light of the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Other papers authored by Dr. David Krackhardt

Social Network Analysis Case Studies

Orgnet has experience in over 500 diverse consulting projects applying social network analysis [SNA] and organizational network analysis [ONA]. We have worked with large, medium, and small businesses, governments, universities, not-for-profits and their funders, and many consulting firms.

Organizations, Projects, & Teams
Human Capital + Social Capital = [PDF]
Managing the 21st Century Organization [PDF]
Networks of Adaptive/Agile Organizations [PDF]
Human Relationships & Organizational Performance [PDF]
Best Practice: Organizational Network Mapping [PDF]
Discovering Communities of Practice [Read...]
Data-Mining E-mail [Read...]
Finding Leaders on your Team [Read...]
Post-Merger Integration [Read...]
SMEs and Go-To People via Expert Finder [Read...]
Innovation happens at the Intersections [Read...]
Partnerships and Alliances in Industry [Read...]
Decision-Making in Organizations [Read...]
New Organizational Structures [Read...]

Local Communities
Network Mapping and Network Weaving [Blog...]
Building Local Economic Networks [PDF]
SNA supports Economic Justice [Read...]

Influence, Diffusion & Contagion
Social Networking in Academia [Read...]
Contact Tracing and the Spread of Disease [Read...]
Co-Authorship Networks [Read...]
Key Opinion Leaders [Read...]

Politics & Power
Social Networks and Voting [PDF]
Lobbying and Influence in Government [Read...]
Interactive Network Map of the Mideast [Read...]
Knowledge exchange amongst EU countries [Read...]
Russia v. Ukraine - Pipeline Politics & Power [Read...]
Understanding Power in Networks [PDF]
Political Book Networks [Read...]

Covert Networks
Uncloaking Terrorist Networks [Read...]
Connecting the Dots - Tracking Terrorists [Read...]
Network Map of the 9/11 Terrorist Network [Read...]
Uncovering Economic Conspiracies [Read...]
Baseball's Steroid Network [Read...]
Mortgage Fraud Network [Read...]

Internet
Esther Dyson's Release 1.0 [PDF]
On-line Social Networks & Communities [Read...]
Interactive Twitter Social Graph [Browse...]
Computer Networks as Social Networks [PDF]
Visualizing Amazon Data [Read...]

Cyber-Vulnerability of Power Grid Monitoring and Control Systems

Authors: Chee-Wooi Ten, Chen-Ching Liu, Manimaran Govindarasu

In this paper, a methodology is proposed for the evaluation of the impact of cyber attacks on the power grid. This is a systematical approach to evaluate the vulnerabilities of SCADA system at
three levels, i.e., system, scenario, and access points. The impact of potential intrusion is evaluated based on the power flow solution. The cause-effect on the proposed method determines the likelihood of the consequence, which can be evaluated based on a substation outage. An IEEE 30 bus system is used to build a test case for the proposed method.

DHS/FBI (U//FOUO) Potential Terrorist Attack Methods

(U//FOUO) Under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) has the responsibility to produce assessments that support the strategic planning needed to enhance the protection and preparedness of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKRs). HITRAC analyzed information about terrorist attack capabilities, goals, and objectives to assess the potential terrorist attack methods that might be used against CIKRs.

(U//FOUO) This paper is complementary to the 2007 Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA). The SHIRA analysis is based on a defined set of 15 attack methods that were identified based on known terrorist capabilities, analysis of terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures, and intelligence reporting on assessed, implied, or stated intent to conduct an attack. This assessment discusses the attack methods in alphabetical order and implies nothing about the probability of one attack method being chosen over another.

(U//FOUO) This attack method compendium provides a broad overview of methods terrorists might use in attacks against Homeland critical infrastructure. Innovation is a hallmark of terrorism, and an actual attack may not mirror past attacks. The compendium offers a basic description of each of the 15 attack methods, including definition, background, key components, and possible methods of employment. The compendium is not intended to provide an all-encompassing or in-depth look at terrorist intent and capability to conduct attacks against specific CIKRs, but rather to provide general overviews to further inform DHS critical infrastructure protection partners of the potential threats they could face.

(U//FOUO) DHS understands that each infrastructure asset is unique and has different vulnerabilities to various types of terrorist threats. It is likely that only a subset of the 15 attack methods presented will be pertinent to any particular site. Alternatively, additional attack methods or threats not addressed in this paper may be of higher concern to an individual infrastructure asset.

…

(U) Identified Terrorist Attack Methods
(U) Aircraft as a Weapon
(U) Biological Attack: Contagious Human Disease
(U) Biological Attack: Noncontagious Human Disease
(U) Biological Attack: Livestock and Crop Disease
(U) Chemical Attack
(U) Cyber Attack
(U) Food or Water Contamination
(U) Hostage-Taking
(U) Improvised Explosive Device
(U) Maritime Vessel as a Weapon
(U) Nuclear Attack
(U) Radiological Dispersal Device
(U) Standoff Weapons: Guided
(U) Standoff Weapons: Unguided
(U) Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device