JIOX - INTELLIGENCE TRADECRAFT & ANALYSIS

COVECTRA Serialization, Track, Trace, Smartphone Serial ID authentication: Brand Loyalty and Integrity Services (BLIS)
NanoGuardian nanoencryption linked to RFID and 2-D barcodes
TruTag Technologies edible microtag
AlpVision Krypsos invisible taggant marking and Digimarc digital watermarking

SecureTrace Consortium case study on RFID and 2-D barcode authentication

GIS RFID
Domino Barcode
Authentix forensic signature

Global Pharma Health Fund (GPHF) Mini-Lab surveillance
Thermo Fisher Nicolet iS10 Fourier Transform - Infrared Red, andTruScan Raman Spectrometer

Fake Medicines may Kill a Million a Year

“While 65,000 people have died in the past 40 years as a result of terrorism, fake medicine has killed 200,000 people in China in one year alone.” - Interpol Secretary-General Ronald Noble quoted in a presentation at an anti-counterfeiting conference in Africa.

Drug Counterfeiting Brief

World Health Organization, International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT)
INTERPOL Medical Product Counterfeiting and Pharmaceutical Crime (MPCPC)Unit
European Commission Taxation and Customs Union

U.S. Department of Justice Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Health and Consumer Goods
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA)

Rx-360 Consortium
International Chamber of Commerce, Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy
Partnership for Safe Medicines
Healthcare Distribution Management Association
LegitScript
National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, Verified Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites (VIPPS)

Biotechnology Industry Organization
World Intellectual Property Organization

Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI)
Permanent Forum of International Pharmaceutical Crime (PFIPC)
Heads of Medicines Agencies Working Group of Enforcement Officers (HMA WGEO)

Global Pharma Health Fund (GPHF) Mini-Lab

Rx Pattern Analysis Tracking Robberies & Other Losses

Visiongain Pharmaceutical Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies and Commercial Analysis 2010-2020

SecuringPharma
Pharmaceutical and Medical Packing News

Links to other organizations

Destabilizing Networks

Authors: Kathleen M.Carley, Ju Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt

The world we live in is a complex socio-technical system. Although social, organizational, and policy analysts have long recognized that groups, organizations, institutions, and the societies they are embedded are complex systems; it is only recently that we have had the tools for systematically thinking about, representing, modelling and analyzing these systems. These tools include multi-agent computer models and the body of statistical tools and measures in social networks.

This paper uses social network analysis and multi-agent models to discuss how to destabilize networks. In addition, we illustrate the potential difficulty in destabilizing networks that are at large, distributed, and composed of individuals linked on a number of socio-demographic dimensions. The specific results herein are generated, and our ability to think through such systems in enhanced, by using a multi-agent network approach to complex systems. Such an illustration is particularly salient in light of the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Other papers authored by Dr. David Krackhardt

Social Network Analysis Case Studies

Orgnet has experience in over 500 diverse consulting projects applying social network analysis [SNA] and organizational network analysis [ONA]. We have worked with large, medium, and small businesses, governments, universities, not-for-profits and their funders, and many consulting firms.

Organizations, Projects, & Teams
Human Capital + Social Capital = [PDF]
Managing the 21st Century Organization [PDF]
Networks of Adaptive/Agile Organizations [PDF]
Human Relationships & Organizational Performance [PDF]
Best Practice: Organizational Network Mapping [PDF]
Discovering Communities of Practice [Read...]
Data-Mining E-mail [Read...]
Finding Leaders on your Team [Read...]
Post-Merger Integration [Read...]
SMEs and Go-To People via Expert Finder [Read...]
Innovation happens at the Intersections [Read...]
Partnerships and Alliances in Industry [Read...]
Decision-Making in Organizations [Read...]
New Organizational Structures [Read...]

Local Communities
Network Mapping and Network Weaving [Blog...]
Building Local Economic Networks [PDF]
SNA supports Economic Justice [Read...]

Influence, Diffusion & Contagion
Social Networking in Academia [Read...]
Contact Tracing and the Spread of Disease [Read...]
Co-Authorship Networks [Read...]
Key Opinion Leaders [Read...]

Politics & Power
Social Networks and Voting [PDF]
Lobbying and Influence in Government [Read...]
Interactive Network Map of the Mideast [Read...]
Knowledge exchange amongst EU countries [Read...]
Russia v. Ukraine - Pipeline Politics & Power [Read...]
Understanding Power in Networks [PDF]
Political Book Networks [Read...]

Covert Networks
Uncloaking Terrorist Networks [Read...]
Connecting the Dots - Tracking Terrorists [Read...]
Network Map of the 9/11 Terrorist Network [Read...]
Uncovering Economic Conspiracies [Read...]
Baseball's Steroid Network [Read...]
Mortgage Fraud Network [Read...]

Internet
Esther Dyson's Release 1.0 [PDF]
On-line Social Networks & Communities [Read...]
Interactive Twitter Social Graph [Browse...]
Computer Networks as Social Networks [PDF]
Visualizing Amazon Data [Read...]

Cyber-Vulnerability of Power Grid Monitoring and Control Systems

Authors: Chee-Wooi Ten, Chen-Ching Liu, Manimaran Govindarasu

In this paper, a methodology is proposed for the evaluation of the impact of cyber attacks on the power grid. This is a systematical approach to evaluate the vulnerabilities of SCADA system at
three levels, i.e., system, scenario, and access points. The impact of potential intrusion is evaluated based on the power flow solution. The cause-effect on the proposed method determines the likelihood of the consequence, which can be evaluated based on a substation outage. An IEEE 30 bus system is used to build a test case for the proposed method.

DHS/FBI (U//FOUO) Potential Terrorist Attack Methods

(U//FOUO) Under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) has the responsibility to produce assessments that support the strategic planning needed to enhance the protection and preparedness of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKRs). HITRAC analyzed information about terrorist attack capabilities, goals, and objectives to assess the potential terrorist attack methods that might be used against CIKRs.

(U//FOUO) This paper is complementary to the 2007 Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA). The SHIRA analysis is based on a defined set of 15 attack methods that were identified based on known terrorist capabilities, analysis of terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures, and intelligence reporting on assessed, implied, or stated intent to conduct an attack. This assessment discusses the attack methods in alphabetical order and implies nothing about the probability of one attack method being chosen over another.

(U//FOUO) This attack method compendium provides a broad overview of methods terrorists might use in attacks against Homeland critical infrastructure. Innovation is a hallmark of terrorism, and an actual attack may not mirror past attacks. The compendium offers a basic description of each of the 15 attack methods, including definition, background, key components, and possible methods of employment. The compendium is not intended to provide an all-encompassing or in-depth look at terrorist intent and capability to conduct attacks against specific CIKRs, but rather to provide general overviews to further inform DHS critical infrastructure protection partners of the potential threats they could face.

(U//FOUO) DHS understands that each infrastructure asset is unique and has different vulnerabilities to various types of terrorist threats. It is likely that only a subset of the 15 attack methods presented will be pertinent to any particular site. Alternatively, additional attack methods or threats not addressed in this paper may be of higher concern to an individual infrastructure asset.

…

(U) Identified Terrorist Attack Methods
(U) Aircraft as a Weapon
(U) Biological Attack: Contagious Human Disease
(U) Biological Attack: Noncontagious Human Disease
(U) Biological Attack: Livestock and Crop Disease
(U) Chemical Attack
(U) Cyber Attack
(U) Food or Water Contamination
(U) Hostage-Taking
(U) Improvised Explosive Device
(U) Maritime Vessel as a Weapon
(U) Nuclear Attack
(U) Radiological Dispersal Device
(U) Standoff Weapons: Guided
(U) Standoff Weapons: Unguided
(U) Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

TF Odin

The Army has quietly decided to try going it alone for the important surveillance mission, organizing an all-Army surveillance unit that represents a new move by the service toward self-sufficiency, and away from joint operations. Senior aides to SECDEF say that he has shown keen interest in the Army initiative — much to the frustration of embattled Air Force leaders — as a potential way to improve battlefield surveillance.

Task Force Odin — the name is that of the chief god of Norse mythology, but it also is an acronym for “observe, detect, identify and neutralize.” The task force of about 300 people and 25 aircraft is a Rube Goldberg collection of surveillance and communications and attack systems, a mash-up of manned and remotely piloted vehicles, commercial aircraft with high-tech infrared sensors strapped to the fuselage, along with attack helicopters and infantry.

The Army cobbled together small civilian aircraft, including the Beech C-12, and placed advanced reconnaissance sensors on board. Also assigned to the task force are small, medium and larger remotely piloted Army surveillance vehicles, including the Warrior and Shadow, with infrared cameras for night operations and full-motion video cameras. All are linked by radio to Apache attack helicopters, with Hellfire missiles and 30-millimeter guns, and to infantry units in armored vehicles.

The work of the new aviation battalion has been exceptionally active, using remotely piloted surveillance aircraft to call in Apache helicopter strikes with missiles and heavy machine gun fire that have killed more than 3,000 adversaries in the last year and led to the capture of almost 150 insurgent leaders.

"At Odds With Air Force, Army Adds Its Own Aviation Unit"

Task Force ODIN Using innovative technology to support ground forces

Son of Hamas: A Gripping Account of Terror, Betrayal, Political Intrigue, and Unthinkable Choices by Mosab Hassan Yousef

Since he was a small boy, Mosab Hassan Yousef has had an inside view of the deadly terrorist group Hamas. The oldest son of Sheikh Hassan Yousef, a founding member of Hamas and its most popular leader, young Mosab assisted his father for years in his political activities while being groomed to assume his legacy, politics, status . . . and power. But everything changed when Mosab turned away from terror and violence, and embraced instead the teachings of another famous Middle East leader. In Son of Hamas, Mosab Yousef--now called "Joseph"--reveals new information about the world's most dangerous terrorist organization and unveils the truth about his own role, his agonizing separation from family and homeland, the dangerous decision to make his newfound faith public, and his belief that the Christian mandate to "love your enemies" is the only way to peace in the Middle East.

By Way of Deception: The Making of a Mossad officer by Victor Ostrovsky

The # 1 New York Times best seller the Israeli foreign intelligence agency The Mossad tried to ban. The making of a Mossad officer is the true story of an officer in Israel's most secret agency. The first time the Mossad came calling, they wanted Victor Ostrovsky for their assassination unit, the kidon. He turned them down. The next time, he agreed to enter the grueling three-year training program to become a katsa, or intelligence case officer, for the legendary Israeli spy organization. By Way of Deception is the explosive chronicle of his experiences in the Mossad, and of two decades of their frightening and often ruthless covert activities around the world. Penetrating far deeper than the bestselling Every Spy a Prince, it is an insider's account of Mossad tactics and exploits. In chilling detail, Ostrovsky asserts that the Mossad refused to share critical knowledge of a planned suicide mission in Beirut, leading to the death of hundreds of U.S. Marines and French troops. He tells how they tracked Yasser Arafat by recruiting his driver and bodyguard; how they withheld information on the whereabouts of American hostages, paving the way for the Iran-Contra scandal; and how their intervention into secret UN negotiations led to the sudden resignation of ambassador Andrew Young and the downfall of his career. By Way of Deception describes the shocking scope and depth of the Mossad's influence, disclosing how Jewish communities in the U.S., Europe, and South America are armed and trained by the organization in secret ?self-defense? units, and how Mossad agents facilitate the drug trade in order to pay the enormous costs of its far-flung, clandestine operation. And it portrays a network that has grown dangerously out of control, as internal squabbles have led to the escape of terrorists and the pursuit of ?policies? completely at odds with the interests of the state of Israel. This document is possibly the most important and controversial book of its kind since Spycatcher.

Digital Triage Forensics: Processing the Digital Crime Scene

The book is designed to be used in the training of our soldiers in battlefield collection principals worldwide. Digital Triage Forensics (DTF) is a procedural model for the investigation of Digital Crime Scenes including both Traditional Crime Scenes and the more complex Battlefield Crime Scenes. The United States Army and other traditional Police agencies use this model for current Digital Forensic Applications. The tool, training, and techniques from this practice are being brought to the public in this book for the first time. Now Corporations, Law Enforcement, and Consultants can benefit from the unique perspectives of the experts who coined "Digital Triage Forensics".

Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War

The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.

The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified.

In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.

In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.