Technical Surveillance / Spyware

The FBI's Digital Collection System Network (DCSNet), is a point-and-click surveillance system that can perform instant wiretaps on almost any communications device in the US. DCSNet allows instant access to all cellphone, landline, SMS communications anywhere in the US from a point-and-click interface.

Carnivore (DCS-1000) was a software-based surveillance tool used to examine all Internet Protocol (IP) packets and record only those packets or packet segments that meet very specific parameters. The Carnivore software system was used together with a tap on ISP networks to “intercept, filter, seize, and decipher digital communications on the Internet”. The system was described as a “specialized network analyzer” that works by “sniffing” a network and copying and storing a warranted subset of its traffic. The Red Hook (DCS-3000) system has replaced Carnivore.

Red Hook, handles pen-registers and trap-and-traces, a type of surveillance that collects signaling information -- primarily the numbers dialed from a telephone -- but no communications content. (Pen registers record outgoing calls; trap-and-traces record incoming calls.)

DCS-6000, known as Digital Storm, captures and collects the content of phone calls and text messages for full wiretap orders.

Source: US DOJ CALEA IG Report March 2006

COTS software: Pen-Link/LINCOLN software and systems let you collect and record intercepted communications of any type - wireline, wireless, VoIP, 3G and IP. Pen-Link also automatically load various formatted call, IP, and transaction records from a wide variety of communication and Internet service providers to databases. Pen-Link provides a robust case database to store, retrieve and visualize all case intelligence. IP session data and content are easily collected, stored, decoded, and reassembled into meaningful reports to visualize what a surveillance target is doing on the Internet. Pen-Link software provides a comprehensive suite of user-defined analytical reports and graphical analysis tools for Link Charting, Timelines, Frequency Graphics, and GIS Location Mapping.

Oasis is software developed by the CIA that converts audio signals into readable and searchable text. It is designed to analyze an audio signal such as a cellphone call in order to identify and label each speaker (Male 1, Male 2, Female 1, and so forth). Oasis is also able to intelligently reference terms, such as by linking "car bomb" with "terrorism". Oasis recognizes key languages such as Arabic, Chinese, etc. COTS: Dragon Naturally Speaking

Magic Lantern is a keystroke logging software which can be installed remotely, via an e-mail attachment or by exploiting common operating system vulnerabilities using backdoors such as: Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K), NetBus, or Sub7 and installing Internet monitoring software. Countermeasure: Antikeylogging encryption software.


Technical Surveillance Counter-Measures (TSCM):
RF Surveillance Detection. Winkleman UK Microscan MS3000


  • 3.5, 2.4 and 1.2 GHz covert cameras and bugs
  • 2.4, 1.8, and 0.9 GHz cell phones and wireless phones
  • 300-400 MHz walkie-talkies, car keys and garage door openers
  • 70-150 MHz FM transmission
  • 49 MHz bugs
  • 27 MHz citizen-band transmissions
Non-linear Junction Detector(NLJD) for detection of hidden electronics, Cellular phone 'Roving bug' , Smartphone Monitoring, Cellular Detectors, Cellular Jammers, RF Jammer

Kingfisher Fibre Optical Microphones
Electret condenser microphone
Audio Transmitters, Nearfield Receivers
Stethoscopes
Laser Microphone Defeater
Wireless Webcam, IR Camera, IR Webcam , Remote sensing and sytems control using cellular phone
1.2GHz/2.4GHz Camera jammer
Pinole and Microchip Cameras, Mobilephone zoom ,Camera phone scan/copy/fax
GPS Tracking Jammer : Anti-GPS Jammer Store
Mobile phone tracking


TSCM Handbook, and other recommended publications.
FM 34-60 Counterintelligence
JCIX

Cellular Telephone Exploitation:
LogicCube CellDEX
Cellebrite
Micro Systemation GSM XRY
Paraben Device Seizure
SIMIS

Media Exploitation:
Low Level:

Blackbird Data Surveyor/Scavenger
ADF Triage-G2

EnCase Portable


High Level:

Digital Intelligence FRED-L
High Tech Crime Institute EDAS FOX
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Using Prediction Markets to Enhance US Intelligence Capabilities by Puong Fei Yeh

In 2001, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) started experimenting with methods for applying market-based concepts to intelligence. One such project, DARPA’s Future Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP) program tested whether prediction markets, markets in which people bet on the likelihood of future events, could be used to improve upon existing approaches to preparing strategic intelligence.

The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive by Robin Hanson
Congressional Record: July 29, 2003 (Senate)
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Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer by Viktor Cherkashin and Gregory Feifer

Victor Cherkashin's incredible career in the KGB spanned thirty-eight years, from Stalin's death in 1953 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this riveting memoir, Cherkashin provides a remarkable insider's view of the KGB's prolonged conflict with the United States, from his recruitment through his rising career in counterintelligence to his prime spot as the KGB's number- two man at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Victor Cherkashin's story will shed stark new light on the KGB's inner workings over four decades and reveal new details about its major cases. Cherkashin's story is rich in episode and drama. He took part in some of the highest-profile Cold War cases, including tracking down U.S. and British spies around the world. He was posted to stations in the U.S., Australia, India, and Lebanon and traveled the globe for operations in England, Europe, and the Middle East. But it was in 1985, known as "the Year of the Spy," that Cherkashin scored two of the biggest coups of the Cold War. In April of that year, he recruited disgruntled CIA officer Aldrich Ames, becoming his principal handler. Refuting and clarifying other published versions, Cherkashin will offer the most complete account on how and why Ames turned against his country. Cherkashin will also reveal new details about Robert Hanssen's recruitment and later exposure, as only he can. And he will address whether there is an undiscovered KGB spy-another Hanssen or Ames-still at large. Spy Handler will be a major addition to Cold War history, told by one of its key participants.

Book review by John Ehrman, CIA Directorate of Intelligence.

Victor Cherkashin, a retired KGB colonel, was awarded the prestigious Order of Lenin. During his four decades working for the KGB, he was stationed at various times in West Germany, India, Australia, Lebanon, and Washington, D.C. Following his retirement, he began a private security company in Russia, which he still runs. He lives in Moscow. Gregory Feifer holds a B.A. and an M.A. in Russian Studies from Harvard. A former Radio Free Europe Moscow correspondent, Feifer lived in Russia from 1998 to 2003. He covered Russian politics for a number of publications, including the Moscow Times, World Policy Journal, and Agence France-Presse. He lives in New York City.

Running a Ring of Spies: Spycraft and Black Operations in the Real World of Espionage by Jefferson Mack
FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations
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Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying by James M. Olson

Revolutionary War officer Nathan Hale, one of America’s first spies, said, “Any kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary.” A statue of Hale stands outside CIA headquarters, and the agency often cites his statement as one of its guiding principles. But who decides what is necessary for the public good, and is it really true that any kind of service is permissible for the public good?

These questions are at the heart of James M. Olson’s book, Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying. Olson, a veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service, takes readers inside the real world of intelligence to describe the difficult dilemmas that field officers face on an almost daily basis. Far from being a dry theoretical treatise, this fascinating book uses actual intelligence operations to illustrate how murky their moral choices can be. Readers will be surprised to learn that the CIA provides very little guidance on what is, or is not, permissible. Rather than empowering field officers, the author has found that this lack of guidelines actually hampers operations. Olson believes that U.S. intelligence officers need clearer moral guidelines to make correct, quick decisions. Significantly, he believes these guidelines should come from the American public, not from closed-door meetings inside the intelligence community. Fair Play will encourage a broad public debate about the proper moral limits on U.S. intelligence activities.
Book review by David Robarge
Scenarios “taken from the real world of espionage and covert action…[that] raise moral issues that US intelligence practitioners currently face or could conceivably face in the future.” :
1. Homosexual Blackmail
2. Trojan Horse
3. False Flag
4. Hit Team
5. Torture
6. Kidnapping and Torture by Surrogates
7. Truth Serum
8. Journalism Cover
9. Operational Use of Journalists
10. Human Rights Violators
11. Torture Training
12. Humanitarian Aid Worker Cover
13. Missionary Cover
14. Operational Use of Academics
15. P-Sources (Professors)
16. Prostitute for Terrorist
17. Child Prostitute
18. Terrorist Act for Bona Fides
19. Election Tampering
20. Seduction and Compromise
21. Romeo Operations
22. Coercive Pitch
23. Feeding a Drug Habit
24. Kidnapping or Killing a Defector
25. Fabricating Evidence
26. L-Devices (lethal)
27. Insertion Operations
28. Fake Diagnosis
29. Drugging a Foreign Diplomat
30. Press Placements
31. Fabricating Academic Credentials
32. Plagiarizing a Ph.D. Dissertation
33. Exposing Unwitting Person to Risk
34. Kamikaze Dolphins
35. Spying on Americans Overseas
36. Spying on Friends
37. Spying on the United Nations
38. Industrial Espionage
39. Bribing a Foreign Government
40. Tampering with U.S. Mail
41. Protection of Code Breaking
42. Breaking a Promise to an Agent
43. Unauthorized Cover
44. Bogus Websites and Chatrooms
45. Back Doors
46. Biological Attack
47. Forging Documents from Friendly Countries
48. Collateral Damage
49. Foreign Officer Visitors
50. Interrogation
James M. Olson is on the faculty of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where he teaches courses on intelligence and national security. He served his entire career in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. His career highlights include serving as the chief of CIA counterintelligence at CIA headquarters and in overseas assignments in Moscow, Vienna, and Mexico City. He lives in College Station, Texas.
Just War, Ethics, and Terror CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence
An Ordinary Spy by Joseph Weisberg
The Honourable Schoolboy by John le Carre
Smiley's People by John le Carre
Ashenden by W. Somerset Maugham
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How to Break A Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq by Matthew Alexander

Finding Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, had long been the U.S. military's top priority — trumping even the search for Osama bin Laden. No brutality was spared in trying to squeeze intelligence from Zarqawi's suspected associates. But these "force on force" techniques yielded exactly nothing, and, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the military rushed a new breed of interrogator to Iraq.

Matthew Alexander, a former criminal investigator and head of a handpicked interrogation team, gives us the first inside look at the U.S. military's attempt at more civilized interrogation techniques — and their astounding success. The intelligence coup that enabled the June 7, 2006, air strike on Zarqawi's rural safe house was the result of several keenly strategized interrogations, none of which involved torture or even "control" tactics.

Matthew and his team decided instead to get to know their opponents. Who were these monsters? Who were they working for? What were they trying to protect? Every day the "'gators" matched wits with a rogues' gallery of suspects brought in by Special Forces ("door kickers"): egomaniacs, bloodthirsty adolescents, opportunistic stereo repairmen, Sunni clerics horrified by the sectarian bloodbath, Al Qaeda fanatics, and good people in the wrong place at the wrong time. With most prisoners, negotiation was possible and psychological manipulation stunningly effective. But Matthew's commitment to cracking the case with these methods sometimes isolated his superiors and put his own career at risk.

This account is an unputdownable thriller — more of a psychological suspense story than a war memoir. And indeed, the story reachesfar past the current conflict in Iraq with a reminder that we don't have to become our enemy to defeat him. Matthew Alexander and his ilk, subtle enough and flexible enough to adapt to the challenges of modern, asymmetrical warfare, have proved to be our best weapons against terrorists all over the world.

Matthew Alexander served for fourteen years in the U.S. Air Force. He has personally conducted more than three hundred interrogations and supervised more than a thousand. He was awarded the Bronze Star for his achievements in Iraq.
Writers Guide to Character Traits by Dr. Linda Edelstein
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Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship - Rountable Report June 2004

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Making the Analytic Review Process Work by Martin Peterson

The Challenge for the Intelligence Analyst by Martin Peterson

Integrating Methodologists into Teams of Substantive Experts by Rob Johnston

Developing a Taxonomy of Intelligence Analysis Variables by Rob Johnston

Supporting US Foreign Policy in the Post 9/11 World by Richard N. Haass

What to Do When Traditional Models Fail: The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis by Carmen A. Medina

Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis: A Counterpoint to "The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis" by Steven R. Ward

Ways to Make Analysis Relevant but not Prescriptive by Fulton T. Armstrong
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National Intelligence Estimates by Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations

A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) represents the U.S. intelligence community’s most authoritative and coordinated written assessment of a specific national-security issue.

CIA NIE: Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program's (October 2002)

DNI NIE: Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States (April 2006)

DNI NIE: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (July 2007)

DNI NIE: Prospect for Iraq's Stability: Some Security progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive (August 2007)

National Intelligence Council NIE - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (November 2007)

CRS Report for Congress: Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress? (December 14, 2007)

CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence: The Making of an NIE
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Bayesian Analysis for Intelligence by Nicholas Schweitzer

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Collecting the Dots: Problem Formulation and Solution Elements by Martin C. Libicki and Shari Lawrence Pfleeger, RAND Corporation

Across a wide variety of endeavors—from homeland security to foreign intelligence, criminal investigation, public health, and system safety—failure to anticipate disaster has been ascribed to the inability to “connect the dots.” This paper argues that to “connect the dots,” one must first “collect the dots.” All too often, the inability to foresee trouble has come about because pieces of information sit in this or that head. Were they combined, trouble would be easier to foresee,
but when each stands alone, no compelling conclusions suggest themselves. This paper investigates some of the barriers to circulating telltale information and describes some approaches—institutional, social, and technological—that would begin to bring information together in a meaningful way.

The prevailing view in the intelligence and public safety communities is that forestalling major threats such as terrorist attacks or epidemics requires weaving together disconnected pieces of information to reveal broader patterns; in more common terms, we call this “connecting the dots.” In this paper, we argue that connecting the dots is less likely to happen unless one takes a prior step: “collecting the dots,” that is, bringing scattered pieces of information into some proximity to each other to enable pattern recognition. This paper is intended to help decisionmakers understand the dimensions of solving the problem of “collecting the dots.” Any solution involves identifying what information is important and improving its circulation within communities that are in a position to connect the dots so collected. The paper describes organizational and informational barriers to “collecting the dots” and explores the characteristics of potential solutions to overcoming them.
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The Secrets of Economic Indicators by Bernard Baumohl

"Whether you're tracking pop culture, high fashion or health care, all things are connected, and economics is the tie that binds them all. For those who need to know more about economic trends and for those who haven't the skills or background in the field, Mr. Baumohl's book is the real deal. He miraculously breathes life into economic indicators and statistics." - The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2005:

"Baumohl, a former economics reporter for Time magazine, has written a tremendously useful source on economic indicators. Baumohl considers a variety of factors when describing each indicator, such as what exactly it measures, how it is computed, where to find the relevant report on the web, the day and time this report is released, the source of the information, and how often the information is revised. He also discusses the market impact of these indicators on bonds, stocks, and currency. Bottom Line: Although this book is marketed as a tool for investors and is not organized like a typical reference book, it belongs in the reference collection because it explains so clearly what the various economic indicators are and how to locate data about them. Recommended for all libraries. " —Stacey Marien, American Univ. Lib., Washington, DC

Technical Analysis of Financial Markets by John Murphy

Economist Intelligence Unit
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Plotting Your Scenarios: An Introduction to the Art and Process of Scenario Planning by Peter Schwartz and Jay Ogilvy

“Plotting Your Scenarios” by GBN cofounders Peter Schwartz and Jay Ogilvy is an invaluable introduction to the art and process of scenario planning, originally published in Learning From the Future (Liam Fahey and Robert Randall, eds, Wiley, 1998).

Scenarios are narratives of alternative environments in which today’s decisions may be played out. They are not predictions. Nor are they strategies. Instead they are more like hypotheses of different futures specifically designed to highlight the risks and opportunities involved in specific strategic issues.

To be an effective planning tool, scenarios should be written in the form of absorbing, convincing stories that describe a broad range of alternative futures relevant to an organization’s success. Thoughtfully constructed, believable plots help managers to become deeply involved in the scenarios and perhaps gain new understanding of how their organization can manage change as a result of this experience. The more involved managers get with scenarios, the more likely it becomes that they will recognize their important but less obvious implications. Moreover, scenarios with engrossing plots can be swiftly communicated throughout the organization and will be more easily remembered by decision-makers at all levels of management.

This essay offers an approach to developing alternative scenarios with engrossing plots. Part One describes two different methods for answering a fundamental challenge: how to whittle the virtually infinite number of possible futures that could be described down to a finitely manageable three or four plots that will shed the most light on a specific organization’s future. Part Two then addresses the inverse question: Once you have determined the skeletal premises of just three or four scenarios, how do you put flesh on the skeletons? How do you elaborate the basic logics of skeletal scenarios into compelling stories? If Part One is about whittling an infinite number of possible futures down to a finite number of skeletal scenarios, Part Two is then about beefing up those skeletal outlines to discover the insights managers need. Part Three then adds 10 tips based on our 20 years of experience developing and using scenarios.

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Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress by Clay Wilson

Summary: Cybercrime is becoming more organized and established as a transnational business. High technology online skills are now available for rent to a variety of customers, possibly including nation states, or individuals and groups that could secretly represent terrorist groups. The increased use of automated attack tools by cybercriminals has overwhelmed some current methodologies used for tracking Internet cyberattacks, and vulnerabilities of the U.S. critical infrastructure, which are acknowledged openly in publications, could possibly attract cyberattacks to extort money, or damage the U.S. economy to affect national security.

In April and May 2007, NATO and the United States sent computer security experts to Estonia to help that nation recover from cyberattacks directed against government computer systems, and to analyze the methods used and determine the source of the attacks. Some security experts suspect that political protestors may have rented the services of cybercriminals, possibly a large network of infected PCs, called a “botnet,” to help disrupt the computer systems of the Estonian government. DOD officials have also indicated that similar cyberattacks from individuals and countries targeting economic, political, and military organizations may increase in the future.

Cybercriminals have reportedly made alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and elsewhere where profitable illegal activities are used to support terrorist groups. In addition, designs for cybercrime botnets are becoming more sophisticated, and future botnet architectures may be more resistant to computer security countermeasures.

This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses options now open to nation states, extremists, or terrorist groups for obtaining malicious technical services from cybercriminals to meet political or military objectives, and describes the possible effects of a coordinated cyberattack against the U.S. critical infrastructure. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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How Terrorist Groups End Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida by Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki

RAND Monograph. Summary: All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? Answers to this question have enormous implications for counterterrorism efforts. The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa’ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post–September 11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida.

The ending of most terrorist groups requires a range of policy instruments, such as careful police and intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic sanctions. Yet policy makers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. Following an examination of 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, we found that a transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended (43 percent). The possibility of a political solution is inversely linked to the breadth of terrorist goals. Most terrorist groups that end because of politics seek narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals of a terrorist organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent action—and the more likely the government and terrorist group may be able to reach a negotiated settlement.

Against terrorist groups that cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy (40 percent). Police and intelligence services have better training and information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations than do such institutions as the military. They are the primary arm of the government focused on internal security matters. Local police and intelligence agencies usually have a permanent presence in cities, towns, and villages; a better understanding of the threat environment in these areas; and better human intelligence.

Other reasons are less common. For example, in 10 percent of the cases, terrorist groups ended because their goals were achieved, and military force led to the end of terrorist groups in 7 percent of the cases. Militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist groups engaged in an insurgency in which the groups were large, well armed, and well organized. Insurgent groups have been among the most capable and lethal terrorist groups, and military force has usually been a necessary component in such cases. Against most terrorist groups, however, military force is usually too blunt an instrument. Military tools have increased in precision and lethality, especially with the growing use of precision standoff weapons and imagery to monitor terrorist movement. But even precision weapons have been of limited use against terrorist groups. The use of substantial U.S. military power against terrorist groups also runs a significant risk of turning the local population against the government by killing civilians.

Our quantitative analysis looked at groups that have ended since 1968 or are still active. It yielded several other interesting findings:

  • Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups. Approximately 62 percent of all terrorist groups have ended since 1968, but only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended.
  • Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives. No religious group that has ended achieved victory since 1968.
  • Size is a significant determinant of a group’s fate. Big groups of more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25 percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller than 1,000 members.
  • There is no statistical correlation between the duration of a terrorist group and ideological motivation, economic conditions,regime type, or the breadth of terrorist goals. But there appears to be some correlation between the size of a terrorist group and duration: Larger groups tend to last longer than smaller groups.
  • When a terrorist group becomes involved in an insurgency, it does not end easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time, groups ended by negotiating a settlement with the government; 25 percent of the time, they achieved victory; and 19 percent of the time, military forces defeated them.
  • Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be motivated by religion.
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A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They Strike by Brent Smith, Ph.D.


National Institute of Justice Journal No. 260, U.S. Justice Department
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