Machines don't fight wars. Terrain doesn't fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the mind of humans. That's where the battles are won. - COL John R. Boyd
See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism by Robert Baer
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This memoir, I hope, will show the reader how spying is supposed to work, where the CIA lost its way, and how we can bring it back again. But I hope this book will accomplish one more purpose as well: I hope it will show why I am angry about what happened to the CIA. And I want to show why every American and everyone who cares about the preservation of this country should be angry and alarmed, too.
The CIA was systematically destroyed by political correctness, by petty Beltway wars, by careerism, and much more. At a time when terrorist threats were compounding globally, the agency that should have been monitoring them was being scrubbed clean instead. Americans were making too much money to bother. Life was good. The White House and the National Security Council became cathedrals of commerce where the interests of big business outweighed the interests of protecting American citizens at home and abroad. Defanged and dispirited, the CIA went along for the ride. And then on September 11, 2001, the reckoning for such vast carelessness was presented for all the world to see.
The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political by Robert D Steele
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The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats by Robert D Steele
This monograph is the third in the Strategic Studies Institute's "Studies in Asymmetry" Series. In it, the author examines two paradigm shifts--one in relation to the threat and a second in relation to intelligence methods-- while offering a new model for threat analysis and a new model for intelligence operations in support to policy, acquisition, and command engaged in nontraditional asymmetric warfare. He concludes with an examination of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs.
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS)
The joint Combatant Commanders require responsive information exchange between combined forces and the joint combatant commands region-to-region for global operations. In a concerted endeavor, the combatant commands (COCOMs) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD[NII])CENTRIXS Program Office(CPMO)are building a common global multinational information sharing enterprise called CENTRIXS; Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System.
CENTRIXS is the premier network for coalition interoperability in support of military operations. Ongoing coalition operations continue to test and prove the viability of the CENTRIXS enterprise. Information flow to coalition partners via the multiple versions of CENTRIXS networks achieved unprecedented volume and continues to expand. CENTRIXS dissemination capabilities must become even more robust as the trend to move more command and control operations to the coalition networks continues.
CENTRIXS is the premier network for coalition interoperability in support of military operations. Ongoing coalition operations continue to test and prove the viability of the CENTRIXS enterprise. Information flow to coalition partners via the multiple versions of CENTRIXS networks achieved unprecedented volume and continues to expand. CENTRIXS dissemination capabilities must become even more robust as the trend to move more command and control operations to the coalition networks continues.
The Thinker's Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving by Morgan D Jones
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Morgan D Jones discovered the analytical techniques used in the Thinker's Toolkit while serving as an intelligence analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency.
Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning by Cynthia M Grabo
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CIA University Studies in Intelligence, and Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers
CIA University is pleased to make available this electronic archive of articles and indexes on the profession of intelligence. The articles are taken from CIA’s 50-year old professional journal, Studies in Intelligence, and from a new series of papers produced by the Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis entitled Kent Center Occasional Papers. The archive includes over 600 of the unclassified and declassified articles that have been published in Studies and nine Occasional Papers. As resources permit, more articles will be included in later releases of this index/archive database.
Interrogator: The story of Hanns Joachim Scharff, Master Interrogator of the Luftwaffe by Raymond F Toliver
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How the Web Can Relieve Our Information Glut and Get Us Talking to Each Other by Matthew S Burton
In June 2005, the Director of National Intelligence issued a call for submissions for the second Galileo Awards contest. Intelligence professionals are invited to offer innovative ideas to shape the future of US intelligence. The program is designed to tap into the wealth of talent and ideas that reside at all levels of seniority and responsibility in the Intelligence Community.
Two articles from among the top entries in last year’s inaugural running of the program— modified slightly and updated— are included in this issue of Studies, beginning here.
Two articles from among the top entries in last year’s inaugural running of the program— modified slightly and updated— are included in this issue of Studies, beginning here.
What To Do When Traditional Models Fail by Carmen A Medina
CIA Studies in Intelligence VOL. 46, NO. 3, 2002 UNCLASSIFIED EDITION
Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence" by Michael Warner
CIA Studies in Intelligence VOL. 46, NO. 3, 2002 UNCLASSIFIED EDITION
Ways To Make Analysis Relevant But Not Prescriptive by Fulton T Armstrong
CIA Studies in Intelligence VOL. 46, NO. 3, 2002 UNCLASSIFIED EDITION
The Challenge for the Political Analyst by Martin Peterson
CIA Studies in Intelligence VOL. 47, NO. 1, 2003 UNCLASSIFIED EDITION
Failing to Keep Up With the Information Revolution by Bruce Berkowitz
CIA Studies In Intelligence VOL. 47, NO. 1, 2003 UNCLASSIFIED EDITION
Body of Secrets by James Bamford
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Body of Secrets takes the reader into a world few have ever seen. It is a world where computer systems are measured by the acre. Where massive listening posts, like moon-bases, eavesdrop on foreign governments and terrorists—including suspected bomber Osama bin Ladin talking over the telephone to his mother. Where crewmembers on risky eavesdropping missions fly close to hostile lands, and sometimes never return. In his new book, James Bamford, for the first time, explores the vital role played by America's eavesdroppers and codebreakers during the tension-filled years of the Cold War. He also looks into whether the new telecommunications revolution is causing NSA to suddenly go deaf. And he addresses the issue of Echelon, the worldwide NSA operation that, many charge, is illegally eavesdropping on innocent citizens. Finally, he takes his readers on the first tour of the NSA's hidden, city-size complex, nicknamed Crypto City, and introduces them to the unique men and women who occupy that shadowy land.
Chatter (Video) by Robert Baer
Joint Publications: Operations Series 3-0
JP 3-05.1Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations
JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning
JP 3-60 Joint Doctrine for Targeting
JP 3-13.3 Operations Security
JP 3-55 Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveilance and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations
Commanders Handbook for Joint Battle Damage Assessement
JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning
JP 3-60 Joint Doctrine for Targeting
JP 3-13.3 Operations Security
JP 3-55 Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveilance and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations
Commanders Handbook for Joint Battle Damage Assessement
Joint Publications: Intelligence Series 2-0
JP 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations
JP 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting
JP 2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space
JP 2-01.4 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Service Support to Joint Operations
JP 2-0 Dcotrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
JP 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting
JP 2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space
JP 2-01.4 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Service Support to Joint Operations
JP 2-0 Dcotrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
Intelligence in the Internet Era by A. Denis Clift
CIA Studies in Intelligence VOL. 47, NO. 3, 2003
Center of Gravity Analysis by LtCol Michael Bowman
The center of gravity is defined as the foundation of capability – what Clausewitz called the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends … the point at which all our energies should be directed.” This Strategic Research Project uses knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence techniques to identify and describe the background knowledge, concepts, information, and scenarios that would be required to create intelligent agents that would conduct center of gravity analysis. The paper explores the possibility of intelligent agents being used by strategic decision makers to assist in the determination of the center of gravity for a force. If this can be done, it will be a significant step in achieving information superiority and will have a profound impact on joint operational capabilities.
The Big Difference Between Intelligence and Evidence by Bruce Berkowitz
This opinion article appeared in the Washington Post on February 2, 2003.
Bruce Berkowitz is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior analyst at RAND.
Bruce Berkowitz is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior analyst at RAND.
Clausewitzian Friction and Future War by Barry D. Watts
Institute of National Strategic Studies
Barry D. Watts is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Barry D. Watts is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
The National Intelligence Director and Intelligence Analysis
The 9/11 Commission, made a number of recommendations to improve the quality of intelligence analysis. A key recommendation was the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position to manage the national intelligence effort and serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the president. Although the Commission did not address the future role of specific analytical entities, such as the National Intelligence Council (NIC) which prepares National Intelligence Estimates, Congress is currently considering legislation that addresses the issue of the extent of the DNI’s analytical responsibilities. Intelligence reform legislation, including S. 2845 and H.R. 10, would place the National Intelligence Council under the DNI, making the DNI responsible for coordinating community-wide intelligence estimates. Some observers believe that this will complicate a position that has essentially managerial responsibilities. This report will be updated as new information becomes available.
Developing a Taxonomy of Intelligence Analysis Variables by Rob Johnston
CIA Studies in Intelligence VOL. 47, NO. 3, 2003 UNCLASSIFIED EDITION
The Future of American Intelligence, Edited by Peter Berkowitz
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These essays from a diverse group of distinguished contributors deepen our understanding of the new national security threats posed by terrorism, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and by the spread of Islamic extremism. They examine the obstacles to making U.S. intelligence more capable and offer recommendations for effective reform.
The Age of Sacred Terror by Former director and senior director for counterterrorism, National Security Council: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon
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Winner of the 2004 Arthur Ross Book Award from the Council on Foreign Relations
From two of the world’s foremost experts on the new terrorism comes the definitive book on the rise of al-Qaeda and America’s efforts to combat the most innovative and dangerous terrorist group ever. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon trace the growth of radical Islam from its medieval origins and, drawing on their years of counter-terrorism work at the National Security Council, provide essential insights into the thinking of Usama bin Laden and his followers. With unique authority, they analyze why America was unable to defend itself against this revolutionary threat on September 11, 2001, why bin Laden’s apocalyptic creed is gaining ground in the Islamic world, and what the United States must do to stop the new terror.
The U.S. Intelligence Community 5th Ed. by Jeffrey T. Richelson
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Teaching Intelligence: Getting Started by John Macartney
Originally prepared for the 1999 Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), held in Washington, DC, Feb 17-20, 1999. Condensed and updated for the Joint Military Intelligence College sponsored Conference on the Teaching of Intelligence, 18 June 1999. Contents of This Paper:
- What is Intelligence?
- Approaches to Teaching Intelligence
- Ignorance, Conspiracies & James Bond
- Topics to Cover
- Books & Course Materials
- Lessons Learned: My Experience
- Attachment A: My Course at AU
- Attachment B: Putting Intelligence into Foreign Policy Courses
- Attachment C: Getting Yourself Up to Speed on Intelligence
- Attachment D: Case Studies
The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, by Bernard Lewis
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For getting into the mind of the radical Islamist, for achieving a greater cultural understanding of an insidious and relentless foe, this concise, eye-opening book is a must-read in the post-9/11 world.
Thinking In Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers by Richard E. Neustadt
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Both in government and in the private sector, decision makers use history every day, drawing on the past experiences of other people. They assign aides bits and pieces of historical research: going to the files or checking memories and comparing recollections. They look at a great many words on paper. A former high official told the co-authors of this book, “Although the public impression is that Presidents and Secretaries of State have no time to read or think, the truth is that most of them spend an enormous amount of time reading material generated both in the government and outside.” But the uses currently made of history can be more reflective and systematic, and thus more helpful. This book is all about how to do it. Presenting stories of success and failure the authors suggest practices which, if made routine, could at least protect against common mistakes. The target audience consists of decision makers and the men and women who work for them as direct or personal staff.
Rethinking the Principles of War, edited by Anthony D. McIvor
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Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs: Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Challenge to Intelligence by William Nolte, Deputy Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington
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Samuel P. Huntington interview
Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism by Alberto Abadie: Harvard University and NBER
Abstract
This article provides an empirical investigation of the determinants of terrorism at the country level. In contrast with the previous literature on this subject, which focuses on transnational terrorism only, I use a new measure of terrorism that encompasses both domestic and transnational terrorism. In line with the results of some recent studies, this article shows that terrorist risk is not signifcantly higher for poorer countries, once the effects of other country-specific characteristics such as the level of political freedom are taken into account. Political freedom is shown to explain terrorism, but it does so in a non-monotonic way: countries in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes. This result suggests that, as experienced recently in Iraq and previously in Spain and Russia, transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism. Finally, the results suggest that geographic factors are important to sustain terrorist activities.
This article provides an empirical investigation of the determinants of terrorism at the country level. In contrast with the previous literature on this subject, which focuses on transnational terrorism only, I use a new measure of terrorism that encompasses both domestic and transnational terrorism. In line with the results of some recent studies, this article shows that terrorist risk is not signifcantly higher for poorer countries, once the effects of other country-specific characteristics such as the level of political freedom are taken into account. Political freedom is shown to explain terrorism, but it does so in a non-monotonic way: countries in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes. This result suggests that, as experienced recently in Iraq and previously in Spain and Russia, transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism. Finally, the results suggest that geographic factors are important to sustain terrorist activities.
Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 3rd Edition by Robert M. Clark
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The new third edition has been comprehensively revised to reflect changes in the constantly shifting landscape of intelligence. With new examples throughout, Intelligence Analysis now includes discussions of framing effects, human terrain models, cyber collection, computer network exploitation, and more. Further, a new section on the defense analysis challenge clarifies the relationship between the analyst and the customer. Once again, Clark has updated the practical information and day-to-day details as only an experienced hand could, bringing essential clarity and insight to this must-have resource.
Boyd's OODA Loop
"In order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries--or, better yet, get inside [the] adversary's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop. ... Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries--since our adversaries will be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against." - Colonel John Boyd, USAF - The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security
Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror by Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit
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According to the author, the greatest danger for Americans confronting the Islamist threat is to believe—at the urging of U.S. leaders—that Muslims attack us for what we are and what we think rather than for what we do. Blustering political rhetoric “informs” the public that the Islamists are offended by the Western world’s democratic freedoms, civil liberties, inter-mingling of genders, and separation of church and state. However, although aspects of the modern world may offend conservative Muslims, no Islamist leader has fomented jihad to destroy participatory democracy, for example, the national association of credit unions, or coed universities.
Instead, a growing segment of the Islamic world strenuously disapproves of specific U.S. policies and their attendant military, political, and economic implications. Capitalizing on growing anti-U.S. animosity, Osama bin Laden’s genius lies not simply in calling for jihad, but in articulating a consistent and convincing case that Islam is under attack by America. Al Qaeda’s public statements condemn America’s protection of corrupt Muslim regimes, unqualified support for Israel, the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a further litany of real-world grievances. Bin Laden’s supporters thus identify their problem and believe their solution lies in war. Anonymous contends they will go to any length, not to destroy our secular, democratic way of life, but to deter what they view as specific attacks on their lands, their communities, and their religion. Unless U.S. leaders recognize this fact and adjust their policies abroad accordingly, even moderate Muslims will join the bin Laden camp.
Intelligence Essentials for Everyone by Lisa Krizan
Occassional Paper Number Six, Joint Military Intelligence College
The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards J. Heuer, Jr.
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More... The Critical Thinking Community
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. DIA Occasional Paper #14
Developing Thinking Skills: Critical Thinking at the Army Management Staff College
Critical Thinking for the Military Professional
Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental Guide for Strategic Leaders
Critical Thinking on the Web
List of Cognitive Biases
Fallacies by Dr. Michael C. Labossiere
Intelligence Reading Primer
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
An Overview of the Unites States Intelligence Community
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Office of Naval Intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
Air Intelligence Agency
National Air and Space Intelligence Center
Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of Energy
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of State
Department of the Treasury
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Office of Naval Intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
Air Intelligence Agency
National Air and Space Intelligence Center
Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of Energy
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of State
Department of the Treasury
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Studies in Intelligence
Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future
Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future
By Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, U.S. Navy, and John J. Garstka
Proceedings, January 1998
By Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, U.S. Navy, and John J. Garstka
Proceedings, January 1998
The Pentagon's New Map by Thomas P. M. Barnett
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The Pentagon's New Map - Thomas P.M. Barnett
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm
Show me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder. These parts of the world I call the Functioning Core, or Core. But show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and "most important" the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. These parts of the world I call the Non-Integrating Gap, or Gap.
The Intelligence Cycle
Planning/Tasking - Collection - Processing - Analysis - Dissemination
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