by Colonel Peter M. Cullen. Published in Joint Forces Quarterly, Isssue 48.
Targeted killing is “the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit government approval.” In recent years, targeted killing as a tactic in the ongoing campaign against terrorism has generated considerable controversy. Some commentators view it as an indispensable tool and argue for its expanded use, while others question its legality and claim that it is immoral and ultimately ineffective.
While the United States has not explicitly acknowledged pursuing a policy of targeted killing, insights can be gleaned from published national security documents and official statements that shed light on U.S. willingness to employ targeted killing as a tactic in the campaign against terror. Since September 11, 2001, however, the United States has consistently conducted targeted killing operations against terrorist personnel. This article examines the legality, morality, and potential efficacy of a U.S. policy of targeted killing in its campaign against transnational terror. The conclusion is that, in spite of the genuine controversy surrounding this subject, a carefully circumscribed policy of targeted killing can be a legal, moral, and effective tool in a counterterror proper implementation of a U.S. policy of targeted killing are proposed.
Rendition: The Beast and the Man
by Colonel Kevin M. Cieply. Published in Joint Forces Quarterly, Isssue 48.
"Excessive secrecy, duplicity and clandestine skullduggery are simply not our dish—not only because we are incapable of keeping a secret anyway (our commercial media of communication see to that), but, more importantly, because such operations conflict with our own traditional standards and compromise our diplomacy in other areas. . . . One may say that to deny ourselves this species of capability is to accept a serious limitation on our ability to contend with forces now directed against us. Perhaps; but if so, it is a limitation with which we shall have to live." - George F. Keenan
Trial of CIA, Italian agents provides rare look at intelligence work - LA Times
"Excessive secrecy, duplicity and clandestine skullduggery are simply not our dish—not only because we are incapable of keeping a secret anyway (our commercial media of communication see to that), but, more importantly, because such operations conflict with our own traditional standards and compromise our diplomacy in other areas. . . . One may say that to deny ourselves this species of capability is to accept a serious limitation on our ability to contend with forces now directed against us. Perhaps; but if so, it is a limitation with which we shall have to live." - George F. Keenan
Trial of CIA, Italian agents provides rare look at intelligence work - LA Times
Disrupting Threat Finances: Using Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations
by Wesley J.L. Anderson, Joint Special Operations University 08-3
Terrorist financing is a critical issue in the current fight against transnational terrorist networks or groups.
Major Anderson provides an excellent overview of terrorist financing and expands upon how it fits into the broader construct of threat financing. He articulates the significant challenges any government faces in trying to interrupt the terrorist networks use of the global financial system. The sheer immensity of this system provides ample opportunity for terrorists to operate undetected or unhindered. He also highlights that the very international nature of the global economic system presents enormous challenges in trying to coordinate amongst the almost 200 sovereign states that comprise the current world order.
INTERPOL Links:
Funds derived from criminal activities
Alternative remittance systems distinguishing sub-systems of ethnic money laundering in INTERPOL member countries on the Asian continent
The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering
Terrorist financing is a critical issue in the current fight against transnational terrorist networks or groups.
Major Anderson provides an excellent overview of terrorist financing and expands upon how it fits into the broader construct of threat financing. He articulates the significant challenges any government faces in trying to interrupt the terrorist networks use of the global financial system. The sheer immensity of this system provides ample opportunity for terrorists to operate undetected or unhindered. He also highlights that the very international nature of the global economic system presents enormous challenges in trying to coordinate amongst the almost 200 sovereign states that comprise the current world order.
INTERPOL Links:
Funds derived from criminal activities
Alternative remittance systems distinguishing sub-systems of ethnic money laundering in INTERPOL member countries on the Asian continent
The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering
Does President Obama Need a Better CIA Spy Network?
by Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
The U.S. devotes about $50 billion yearly to efforts to assess the capabilities and intentions of other nations. Most of it buys satellite imagery and technology to intercept and decode communications. A big chunk goes to the military for its operational needs, a smaller part to the CIA for analyses and on-the-ground espionage.
President Obama will be looking to find out the answers to big questions such as these: Where is Osama bin Laden? Are Iranian and North Korean leaders determined to pursue nuclear-weapons programs? Will Iraqi leaders be able to govern together in peace? Can the political future of Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai be salvaged?
Over the years, U.S. intelligence has delivered good value on matters such as whether Russia would raise oil prices or on the size of China's military. But on many vital questions, the payoffs were dismal: whether the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 could rally Cubans against Castro and the danger of the Shah of Iran's being overthrown in 1979.
Every President has tried to correct deficiencies. They've hired and fired CIA chiefs. Or they've circumvented the system by getting information directly from their foreign counterparts. Since they've spent their lives sizing up people, many Presidents figure they can do that better than the CIA. They're almost always wrong. Bill Clinton thought he had such a fix on Yasir Arafat that he gambled U.S. prestige on the Palestinian's agreeing to a peace accord with Israel in 2000; Arafat refused to sign. George W. Bush met with Russia's Vladimir Putin in 2001 and said, "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy...I was able to get a sense of his soul."
It seems Bush missed a thing or two in his peek into Putin's soul. President Kennedy used another technique. In 1963, he sent two experts with very different backgrounds to Vietnam to tell him what was happening. Maj. Gen. Victor "Brute" Krulak and career diplomat Joseph Mendenhall came back with such wildly divergent accounts that Kennedy quipped, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?" The dirty little secret is that it's difficult to deliver the information Presidents want. Why?
First, it is hard to predict political events. Why should intelligence agencies be able to forecast the future abroad when we can't do it here? In addition, great upheavals - like the collapse of the Soviet Union - generally don't announce themselves. They erupt from long-suppressed hatred that transcends the fear of police or military reprisals.
Second, adversaries will zealously guard their positions on critical issues. Experts probably will never stop debating whether North Korea is ready to cash in its nuclear weapons in exchange for bribes. What's going on in foreign leaders' heads is often revealed only after Presidents act and make proposals, which spark reactions and unearth underlying aims. Similarly, adversaries do well at concealing their most important secrets, especially those related to sensitive weapons. In the Cold War, we ringed the Soviet Union with listening posts and satellites and still couldn't track many of its programs. In 1998, we were clueless about India's plans to explode a nuclear device, despite heavy surveillance. Nor did Washington ever have a real fix on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, pressure on intelligence experts to conform their estimates to Presidential policies is inescapable, and it distorts evaluations. Once the President takes a clear stance, the intelligence community rarely contradicts him - except with anonymous leaks. Intelligence is a major battlefield on which policy battles are fought. Knowledge is power, and every player in Washington fights to define reality for the President. When hawks convinced U.S. leaders that Moscow had military superiority, they won the ability to spend more on defense and to resist negotiating. If hard-liners persuade Obama today that Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is hell-bent on destroying Israel and the U.S., they'll win the debate on taking action to overthrow him.
Every country - not just the U.S. - has problems obtaining good intelligence. Even with the best espionage and analysts, they can't escape the distortions of their culture and politics. Presidents can also take consolation in the fact that as important as good intelligence is to successful policy, there are more important factors. The Soviets had all the intelligence their hearts desired during the Cold War with double agents like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen. These U.S. spies knew our secrets and helped keep Moscow in the power competition against America. We had no comparable agents. Still, the Soviets lost the Cold War hands down. They had better intelligence, but we had a much better country. [Gelb/Parade/8March2009]
The U.S. devotes about $50 billion yearly to efforts to assess the capabilities and intentions of other nations. Most of it buys satellite imagery and technology to intercept and decode communications. A big chunk goes to the military for its operational needs, a smaller part to the CIA for analyses and on-the-ground espionage.
President Obama will be looking to find out the answers to big questions such as these: Where is Osama bin Laden? Are Iranian and North Korean leaders determined to pursue nuclear-weapons programs? Will Iraqi leaders be able to govern together in peace? Can the political future of Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai be salvaged?
Over the years, U.S. intelligence has delivered good value on matters such as whether Russia would raise oil prices or on the size of China's military. But on many vital questions, the payoffs were dismal: whether the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 could rally Cubans against Castro and the danger of the Shah of Iran's being overthrown in 1979.
Every President has tried to correct deficiencies. They've hired and fired CIA chiefs. Or they've circumvented the system by getting information directly from their foreign counterparts. Since they've spent their lives sizing up people, many Presidents figure they can do that better than the CIA. They're almost always wrong. Bill Clinton thought he had such a fix on Yasir Arafat that he gambled U.S. prestige on the Palestinian's agreeing to a peace accord with Israel in 2000; Arafat refused to sign. George W. Bush met with Russia's Vladimir Putin in 2001 and said, "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy...I was able to get a sense of his soul."
It seems Bush missed a thing or two in his peek into Putin's soul. President Kennedy used another technique. In 1963, he sent two experts with very different backgrounds to Vietnam to tell him what was happening. Maj. Gen. Victor "Brute" Krulak and career diplomat Joseph Mendenhall came back with such wildly divergent accounts that Kennedy quipped, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?" The dirty little secret is that it's difficult to deliver the information Presidents want. Why?
First, it is hard to predict political events. Why should intelligence agencies be able to forecast the future abroad when we can't do it here? In addition, great upheavals - like the collapse of the Soviet Union - generally don't announce themselves. They erupt from long-suppressed hatred that transcends the fear of police or military reprisals.
Second, adversaries will zealously guard their positions on critical issues. Experts probably will never stop debating whether North Korea is ready to cash in its nuclear weapons in exchange for bribes. What's going on in foreign leaders' heads is often revealed only after Presidents act and make proposals, which spark reactions and unearth underlying aims. Similarly, adversaries do well at concealing their most important secrets, especially those related to sensitive weapons. In the Cold War, we ringed the Soviet Union with listening posts and satellites and still couldn't track many of its programs. In 1998, we were clueless about India's plans to explode a nuclear device, despite heavy surveillance. Nor did Washington ever have a real fix on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, pressure on intelligence experts to conform their estimates to Presidential policies is inescapable, and it distorts evaluations. Once the President takes a clear stance, the intelligence community rarely contradicts him - except with anonymous leaks. Intelligence is a major battlefield on which policy battles are fought. Knowledge is power, and every player in Washington fights to define reality for the President. When hawks convinced U.S. leaders that Moscow had military superiority, they won the ability to spend more on defense and to resist negotiating. If hard-liners persuade Obama today that Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is hell-bent on destroying Israel and the U.S., they'll win the debate on taking action to overthrow him.
Every country - not just the U.S. - has problems obtaining good intelligence. Even with the best espionage and analysts, they can't escape the distortions of their culture and politics. Presidents can also take consolation in the fact that as important as good intelligence is to successful policy, there are more important factors. The Soviets had all the intelligence their hearts desired during the Cold War with double agents like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen. These U.S. spies knew our secrets and helped keep Moscow in the power competition against America. We had no comparable agents. Still, the Soviets lost the Cold War hands down. They had better intelligence, but we had a much better country. [Gelb/Parade/8March2009]
Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. February 25, 2009
Hearing of the House Permanent Select COmmittee on Intelligence. February 25, 2009
Hearing of the House Permanent Select COmmittee on Intelligence. February 25, 2009
Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies by Walter L. Perry, John Gordon IV
RAND Monograph
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. Beyond the experience in these two countries, it is likely that U.S. forces will face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies that are unwilling to engage in conventional combat with U.S. forces. This suggests the need for a well-structured systems analysis process to address the insurgent threat as it is evolving in Iraq and Afghanistan and to assist in the development of more-general approaches to such
threats in future campaigns.
This monograph presents a broad range of analytic techniques that can be used to support the security portion of counterinsurgency operations. Its purpose is not to discuss the broader elements of counterinsurgency, such as nation-building and improvements to governance in nations threatened with insurgency. Instead, it combines research supporting two complementary studies: one focused on ways to improve U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities and a second aimed at developing
operational analysis techniques to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The first study provides a framework for thinking about the nature of an insurgency and the latter then examines operational analysis techniques to answer the operational and tactical counterinsurgency questions that evolve at each stage in the insurgency.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. Beyond the experience in these two countries, it is likely that U.S. forces will face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies that are unwilling to engage in conventional combat with U.S. forces. This suggests the need for a well-structured systems analysis process to address the insurgent threat as it is evolving in Iraq and Afghanistan and to assist in the development of more-general approaches to such
threats in future campaigns.
This monograph presents a broad range of analytic techniques that can be used to support the security portion of counterinsurgency operations. Its purpose is not to discuss the broader elements of counterinsurgency, such as nation-building and improvements to governance in nations threatened with insurgency. Instead, it combines research supporting two complementary studies: one focused on ways to improve U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities and a second aimed at developing
operational analysis techniques to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The first study provides a framework for thinking about the nature of an insurgency and the latter then examines operational analysis techniques to answer the operational and tactical counterinsurgency questions that evolve at each stage in the insurgency.
The Critical Thinking Community
Videos:
Critical Thinking - Standards of Thought - Part 1
Critical Thinking - Standards of Thought - Part 2
Critical Thinking and the Basic Elements of Thought
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. DIA Occasional Paper #14
Critical Thinking - Standards of Thought - Part 1
Critical Thinking - Standards of Thought - Part 2
Critical Thinking and the Basic Elements of Thought
Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. DIA Occasional Paper #14
How to Spot a Liar: Why People Don't Tell the Truth And How You Can Catch Them by Gregory Hartley
What if you could tell someone was lying, just by listening to them, and observing their action and behavior?Author Greg Hartley is a decorated military interrogator who has used the techniques in How to Spot a Liar for 16 years to get the truth from enemy combatants. He has successfully applied them to project management and in contract negotiations, to resolve conflict and prevail. Now he shares this scientific process with you so you can use it every day.
Gregory Hartley's expertise as an interrogator first earned him honors with the U.S. Army. More recently, it has drawn organizations such as the CIA and national TV to seek his insights about "how to" as well as "why."
Pamela Meyer: How to spot a liar On any given day we're lied to from 10 to 200 times, and the clues to detect those lie can be subtle and counter-intuitive. Pamela Meyer, author of Liespotting, shows the manners and "hotspots" used by those trained to recognize deception -- and she argues honesty is a value worth preserving.
The Facial Action Coding System (FACS)
The Facial Action Coding System (FACS) by Paul Ekman, Wallace V. Friesen, and Joseph C. Hager is a method for measuring facial behaviors. It illustrates appearance changes of the face using written descriptions, still images, and digital video examples. FACS, a coding of the 43 facial muscles, was revised in 2002, and is used by professionals such as psychologists, psychiatrists, neurologists, all over the world.FACS has had a significant impact on research methods used to study the face, nonverbal communication, and emotion . When people make faces--whether spontaneous and concealed emotions - microexpressions, or deliberate contortions--they engage muscles around the eyes, mouth, nose and forehead. With FACS, Ekman and Friesen detailed which muscles move during which facial expressions. Working through the exercises of the FACS Manual may also enable greater awareness of and sensitivity to subtle facial behaviors that could be useful for psychotherapists, interviewers, and other practitioners who must penetrate deeply into interpersonal communications.
Institutions such as the CIA, FBI MI6, and Scotland Yard, have repeatedly invited Paul Ekman to give his opinion or training workshops in “face reading” techniques. Some of the research is presented in the white papers: A Few Can Catch a Liar, and Why don't we Catch Liars?
The FACS Manual, Investigator's Guide, multimedia files, and computer program are available in eBook (PDF) format on a CD ROM. You can read a detailed description of the FACS product and/or read an HTML version of the first two chapters of the FACS Manual and the first five chapters of the Investigator's Guide. The books on CD work with most computers (see System Support for compatibility guidelines). You can buy the new version of Facial Action Coding System online.
Videos: Emotions Revealed KQED QUEST
Face to Face: The Science of Reading Faces
Test your skill: Can you detect a fake smile?
Battelle FAST
RealaeR Hostile Intent
Technical Surveillance / Spyware
The FBI's Digital Collection System Network (DCSNet), is a point-and-click surveillance system that can perform instant wiretaps on almost any communications device in the US. DCSNet allows instant access to all cellphone, landline, SMS communications anywhere in the US from a point-and-click interface.
Carnivore (DCS-1000) was a software-based surveillance tool used to examine all Internet Protocol (IP) packets and record only those packets or packet segments that meet very specific parameters. The Carnivore software system was used together with a tap on ISP networks to “intercept, filter, seize, and decipher digital communications on the Internet”. The system was described as a “specialized network analyzer” that works by “sniffing” a network and copying and storing a warranted subset of its traffic. The Red Hook (DCS-3000) system has replaced Carnivore.
Red Hook, handles pen-registers and trap-and-traces, a type of surveillance that collects signaling information -- primarily the numbers dialed from a telephone -- but no communications content. (Pen registers record outgoing calls; trap-and-traces record incoming calls.)
DCS-6000, known as Digital Storm, captures and collects the content of phone calls and text messages for full wiretap orders.
Source: US DOJ CALEA IG Report March 2006
COTS software: Pen-Link/LINCOLN software and systems let you collect and record intercepted communications of any type - wireline, wireless, VoIP, 3G and IP. Pen-Link also automatically load various formatted call, IP, and transaction records from a wide variety of communication and Internet service providers to databases. Pen-Link provides a robust case database to store, retrieve and visualize all case intelligence. IP session data and content are easily collected, stored, decoded, and reassembled into meaningful reports to visualize what a surveillance target is doing on the Internet. Pen-Link software provides a comprehensive suite of user-defined analytical reports and graphical analysis tools for Link Charting, Timelines, Frequency Graphics, and GIS Location Mapping.
Oasis is software developed by the CIA that converts audio signals into readable and searchable text. It is designed to analyze an audio signal such as a cellphone call in order to identify and label each speaker (Male 1, Male 2, Female 1, and so forth). Oasis is also able to intelligently reference terms, such as by linking "car bomb" with "terrorism". Oasis recognizes key languages such as Arabic, Chinese, etc. COTS: Dragon Naturally Speaking
Magic Lantern is a keystroke logging software which can be installed remotely, via an e-mail attachment or by exploiting common operating system vulnerabilities using backdoors such as: Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K), NetBus, or Sub7 and installing Internet monitoring software. Countermeasure: Antikeylogging encryption software.
Technical Surveillance Counter-Measures (TSCM):
RF Surveillance Detection. Winkleman UK Microscan MS3000
Kingfisher Fibre Optical Microphones
Electret condenser microphone
Audio Transmitters, Nearfield Receivers
Stethoscopes
Laser Microphone Defeater
Wireless Webcam, IR Camera, IR Webcam , Remote sensing and sytems control using cellular phone
1.2GHz/2.4GHz Camera jammer
Pinole and Microchip Cameras, Mobilephone zoom ,Camera phone scan/copy/fax
GPS Tracking Jammer : Anti-GPS Jammer Store
Mobile phone tracking
TSCM Handbook, and other recommended publications.
FM 34-60 Counterintelligence
JCIX
Cellular Telephone Exploitation:
LogicCube CellDEX
Cellebrite
Micro Systemation GSM XRY
Paraben Device Seizure
SIMIS
Media Exploitation:
Low Level:
Blackbird Data Surveyor/Scavenger
ADF Triage-G2
EnCase Portable
High Level:
Digital Intelligence FRED-L
High Tech Crime Institute EDAS FOX
Carnivore (DCS-1000) was a software-based surveillance tool used to examine all Internet Protocol (IP) packets and record only those packets or packet segments that meet very specific parameters. The Carnivore software system was used together with a tap on ISP networks to “intercept, filter, seize, and decipher digital communications on the Internet”. The system was described as a “specialized network analyzer” that works by “sniffing” a network and copying and storing a warranted subset of its traffic. The Red Hook (DCS-3000) system has replaced Carnivore.
Red Hook, handles pen-registers and trap-and-traces, a type of surveillance that collects signaling information -- primarily the numbers dialed from a telephone -- but no communications content. (Pen registers record outgoing calls; trap-and-traces record incoming calls.)
DCS-6000, known as Digital Storm, captures and collects the content of phone calls and text messages for full wiretap orders.
Source: US DOJ CALEA IG Report March 2006
COTS software: Pen-Link/LINCOLN software and systems let you collect and record intercepted communications of any type - wireline, wireless, VoIP, 3G and IP. Pen-Link also automatically load various formatted call, IP, and transaction records from a wide variety of communication and Internet service providers to databases. Pen-Link provides a robust case database to store, retrieve and visualize all case intelligence. IP session data and content are easily collected, stored, decoded, and reassembled into meaningful reports to visualize what a surveillance target is doing on the Internet. Pen-Link software provides a comprehensive suite of user-defined analytical reports and graphical analysis tools for Link Charting, Timelines, Frequency Graphics, and GIS Location Mapping.
Oasis is software developed by the CIA that converts audio signals into readable and searchable text. It is designed to analyze an audio signal such as a cellphone call in order to identify and label each speaker (Male 1, Male 2, Female 1, and so forth). Oasis is also able to intelligently reference terms, such as by linking "car bomb" with "terrorism". Oasis recognizes key languages such as Arabic, Chinese, etc. COTS: Dragon Naturally Speaking
Magic Lantern is a keystroke logging software which can be installed remotely, via an e-mail attachment or by exploiting common operating system vulnerabilities using backdoors such as: Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K), NetBus, or Sub7 and installing Internet monitoring software. Countermeasure: Antikeylogging encryption software.
Technical Surveillance Counter-Measures (TSCM):
RF Surveillance Detection. Winkleman UK Microscan MS3000
- 3.5, 2.4 and 1.2 GHz covert cameras and bugs
- 2.4, 1.8, and 0.9 GHz cell phones and wireless phones
- 300-400 MHz walkie-talkies, car keys and garage door openers
- 70-150 MHz FM transmission
- 49 MHz bugs
- 27 MHz citizen-band transmissions
Kingfisher Fibre Optical Microphones
Electret condenser microphone
Audio Transmitters, Nearfield Receivers
Stethoscopes
Laser Microphone Defeater
Wireless Webcam, IR Camera, IR Webcam , Remote sensing and sytems control using cellular phone
1.2GHz/2.4GHz Camera jammer
Pinole and Microchip Cameras, Mobilephone zoom ,Camera phone scan/copy/fax
GPS Tracking Jammer : Anti-GPS Jammer Store
Mobile phone tracking
TSCM Handbook, and other recommended publications.
FM 34-60 Counterintelligence
JCIX
Cellular Telephone Exploitation:
LogicCube CellDEX
Cellebrite
Micro Systemation GSM XRY
Paraben Device Seizure
SIMIS
Media Exploitation:
Low Level:
Blackbird Data Surveyor/Scavenger
ADF Triage-G2
EnCase Portable
High Level:
Digital Intelligence FRED-L
High Tech Crime Institute EDAS FOX
Using Prediction Markets to Enhance US Intelligence Capabilities by Puong Fei Yeh
In 2001, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) started experimenting with methods for applying market-based concepts to intelligence. One such project, DARPA’s Future Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP) program tested whether prediction markets, markets in which people bet on the likelihood of future events, could be used to improve upon existing approaches to preparing strategic intelligence.
The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive by Robin Hanson
Congressional Record: July 29, 2003 (Senate)
The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive by Robin Hanson
Congressional Record: July 29, 2003 (Senate)
Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer by Viktor Cherkashin and Gregory Feifer
Victor Cherkashin's incredible career in the KGB spanned thirty-eight years, from Stalin's death in 1953 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this riveting memoir, Cherkashin provides a remarkable insider's view of the KGB's prolonged conflict with the United States, from his recruitment through his rising career in counterintelligence to his prime spot as the KGB's number- two man at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Victor Cherkashin's story will shed stark new light on the KGB's inner workings over four decades and reveal new details about its major cases. Cherkashin's story is rich in episode and drama. He took part in some of the highest-profile Cold War cases, including tracking down U.S. and British spies around the world. He was posted to stations in the U.S., Australia, India, and Lebanon and traveled the globe for operations in England, Europe, and the Middle East. But it was in 1985, known as "the Year of the Spy," that Cherkashin scored two of the biggest coups of the Cold War. In April of that year, he recruited disgruntled CIA officer Aldrich Ames, becoming his principal handler. Refuting and clarifying other published versions, Cherkashin will offer the most complete account on how and why Ames turned against his country. Cherkashin will also reveal new details about Robert Hanssen's recruitment and later exposure, as only he can. And he will address whether there is an undiscovered KGB spy-another Hanssen or Ames-still at large. Spy Handler will be a major addition to Cold War history, told by one of its key participants.Book review by John Ehrman, CIA Directorate of Intelligence.
Victor Cherkashin, a retired KGB colonel, was awarded the prestigious Order of Lenin. During his four decades working for the KGB, he was stationed at various times in West Germany, India, Australia, Lebanon, and Washington, D.C. Following his retirement, he began a private security company in Russia, which he still runs. He lives in Moscow. Gregory Feifer holds a B.A. and an M.A. in Russian Studies from Harvard. A former Radio Free Europe Moscow correspondent, Feifer lived in Russia from 1998 to 2003. He covered Russian politics for a number of publications, including the Moscow Times, World Policy Journal, and Agence France-Presse. He lives in New York City.
Running a Ring of Spies: Spycraft and Black Operations in the Real World of Espionage by Jefferson Mack
FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations
Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying by James M. Olson
Revolutionary War officer Nathan Hale, one of America’s first spies, said, “Any kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary.” A statue of Hale stands outside CIA headquarters, and the agency often cites his statement as one of its guiding principles. But who decides what is necessary for the public good, and is it really true that any kind of service is permissible for the public good?These questions are at the heart of James M. Olson’s book, Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying. Olson, a veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service, takes readers inside the real world of intelligence to describe the difficult dilemmas that field officers face on an almost daily basis. Far from being a dry theoretical treatise, this fascinating book uses actual intelligence operations to illustrate how murky their moral choices can be. Readers will be surprised to learn that the CIA provides very little guidance on what is, or is not, permissible. Rather than empowering field officers, the author has found that this lack of guidelines actually hampers operations. Olson believes that U.S. intelligence officers need clearer moral guidelines to make correct, quick decisions. Significantly, he believes these guidelines should come from the American public, not from closed-door meetings inside the intelligence community. Fair Play will encourage a broad public debate about the proper moral limits on U.S. intelligence activities.
Book review by David Robarge
Scenarios “taken from the real world of espionage and covert action…[that] raise moral issues that US intelligence practitioners currently face or could conceivably face in the future.” :
1. Homosexual Blackmail
2. Trojan Horse
3. False Flag
4. Hit Team
5. Torture
6. Kidnapping and Torture by Surrogates
7. Truth Serum
8. Journalism Cover
9. Operational Use of Journalists
10. Human Rights Violators
11. Torture Training
12. Humanitarian Aid Worker Cover
13. Missionary Cover
14. Operational Use of Academics
15. P-Sources (Professors)
16. Prostitute for Terrorist
17. Child Prostitute
18. Terrorist Act for Bona Fides
19. Election Tampering
20. Seduction and Compromise
21. Romeo Operations
22. Coercive Pitch
23. Feeding a Drug Habit
24. Kidnapping or Killing a Defector
25. Fabricating Evidence
26. L-Devices (lethal)
27. Insertion Operations
28. Fake Diagnosis
29. Drugging a Foreign Diplomat
30. Press Placements
31. Fabricating Academic Credentials
32. Plagiarizing a Ph.D. Dissertation
33. Exposing Unwitting Person to Risk
34. Kamikaze Dolphins
35. Spying on Americans Overseas
36. Spying on Friends
37. Spying on the United Nations
38. Industrial Espionage
39. Bribing a Foreign Government
40. Tampering with U.S. Mail
41. Protection of Code Breaking
42. Breaking a Promise to an Agent
43. Unauthorized Cover
44. Bogus Websites and Chatrooms
45. Back Doors
46. Biological Attack
47. Forging Documents from Friendly Countries
48. Collateral Damage
49. Foreign Officer Visitors
50. Interrogation
1. Homosexual Blackmail
2. Trojan Horse
3. False Flag
4. Hit Team
5. Torture
6. Kidnapping and Torture by Surrogates
7. Truth Serum
8. Journalism Cover
9. Operational Use of Journalists
10. Human Rights Violators
11. Torture Training
12. Humanitarian Aid Worker Cover
13. Missionary Cover
14. Operational Use of Academics
15. P-Sources (Professors)
16. Prostitute for Terrorist
17. Child Prostitute
18. Terrorist Act for Bona Fides
19. Election Tampering
20. Seduction and Compromise
21. Romeo Operations
22. Coercive Pitch
23. Feeding a Drug Habit
24. Kidnapping or Killing a Defector
25. Fabricating Evidence
26. L-Devices (lethal)
27. Insertion Operations
28. Fake Diagnosis
29. Drugging a Foreign Diplomat
30. Press Placements
31. Fabricating Academic Credentials
32. Plagiarizing a Ph.D. Dissertation
33. Exposing Unwitting Person to Risk
34. Kamikaze Dolphins
35. Spying on Americans Overseas
36. Spying on Friends
37. Spying on the United Nations
38. Industrial Espionage
39. Bribing a Foreign Government
40. Tampering with U.S. Mail
41. Protection of Code Breaking
42. Breaking a Promise to an Agent
43. Unauthorized Cover
44. Bogus Websites and Chatrooms
45. Back Doors
46. Biological Attack
47. Forging Documents from Friendly Countries
48. Collateral Damage
49. Foreign Officer Visitors
50. Interrogation
James M. Olson is on the faculty of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where he teaches courses on intelligence and national security. He served his entire career in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. His career highlights include serving as the chief of CIA counterintelligence at CIA headquarters and in overseas assignments in Moscow, Vienna, and Mexico City. He lives in College Station, Texas.
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Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations by Michael Walzer
Integrity, Ethics, and the CIA: The Need for Improvement by Kent Pekel
Just War, Ethics, and Terror CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence
An Ordinary Spy by Joseph Weisberg
The Spy Who Came In From the Cold by John le Carre
Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy by John le Carre
The Honourable Schoolboy by John le Carre
Smiley's People by John le Carre
Ashenden by W. Somerset Maugham
How to Break A Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq by Matthew Alexander
Finding Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, had long been the U.S. military's top priority — trumping even the search for Osama bin Laden. No brutality was spared in trying to squeeze intelligence from Zarqawi's suspected associates. But these "force on force" techniques yielded exactly nothing, and, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the military rushed a new breed of interrogator to Iraq.Matthew Alexander, a former criminal investigator and head of a handpicked interrogation team, gives us the first inside look at the U.S. military's attempt at more civilized interrogation techniques — and their astounding success. The intelligence coup that enabled the June 7, 2006, air strike on Zarqawi's rural safe house was the result of several keenly strategized interrogations, none of which involved torture or even "control" tactics.
Matthew and his team decided instead to get to know their opponents. Who were these monsters? Who were they working for? What were they trying to protect? Every day the "'gators" matched wits with a rogues' gallery of suspects brought in by Special Forces ("door kickers"): egomaniacs, bloodthirsty adolescents, opportunistic stereo repairmen, Sunni clerics horrified by the sectarian bloodbath, Al Qaeda fanatics, and good people in the wrong place at the wrong time. With most prisoners, negotiation was possible and psychological manipulation stunningly effective. But Matthew's commitment to cracking the case with these methods sometimes isolated his superiors and put his own career at risk.
This account is an unputdownable thriller — more of a psychological suspense story than a war memoir. And indeed, the story reachesfar past the current conflict in Iraq with a reminder that we don't have to become our enemy to defeat him. Matthew Alexander and his ilk, subtle enough and flexible enough to adapt to the challenges of modern, asymmetrical warfare, have proved to be our best weapons against terrorists all over the world.
Matthew Alexander served for fourteen years in the U.S. Air Force. He has personally conducted more than three hundred interrogations and supervised more than a thousand. He was awarded the Bronze Star for his achievements in Iraq.
Writers Guide to Character Traits by Dr. Linda Edelstein
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